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THE TEXAS MIS-STEP: WHY THE LARGEST CHILD
REMOVAL IN MODERN U.S. HISTORY FAILED
JESSICA DIXON WEAVER*
This Article sets forth the historical and legal reasons as to how
the State of Texas botched the removal of 439 children from the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints parents
residing in Eldorado, Texas. The Department of Family and Protective
Services in Texas overreached its authority by treating this case like
a class-action removal based on an impermissible legal argument,
rather than focusing on the facts and circumstances that could have
been substantiated for a select group of children at risk. This imper-
missible legal argument regarding the “pervasive belief system” of
a polygamist sect that allowed minor females to spiritually marry
older adult males sparked questions as to how far the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment go
in protecting religious freedom and parental rights. Ultimately, there
was a failure on both sides of the case — harm caused by the unnec-
essary removal of hundreds of children who were not in immediate
danger of abuse and harm caused by the return of teenage girls who
were at risk for sexual abuse on the Yearning for Zion Ranch. The
Article concludes by discussing key factors that would have made a
difference in the outcome of the case and the impact of this decision
on the interrelationship between parents, the state, and the child.
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INTRODUCTION
The legal case of the Texas Department of Family and Protective
Services (DFPS) versus the parents of the children at the Yearning
for Zion Ranch (YFZ Ranch) in Eldorado, Texas has been one of the
most complex child welfare cases in modern times. On display be-
fore the entire country, hundreds of children of the Fundamentalist
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (FLDS) were removed
from their parents amidst local law enforcement and SWAT teams,
juxtaposing Texas Ranger-style military force against genteel, pioneer-
styled clans from two centuries ago.1 The removal stemmed from an
investigation begun by DFPS when a local family shelter received
several calls from a sixteen-year-old pregnant mother who was report-
edly physically and sexually abused by her “spiritual” husband over
thirty years her senior.2 Though this pregnant teen, Sarah Jessop,
also known as Sarah Barlow, was never found on the YFZ Ranch
1. Miguel Bustillo & Nicholas Riccardi, Texas Vows New Tack Against Sect, L.A.
TIMES, May 31, 2008, at 1; Michelle Roberts, Sweep of Polygamists’ Kids Raises Legal
Alarm, J. GAZETTE (Fort Wayne), Apr. 26, 2008, at 7C.
2. Affidavit in Support of Original Petition for Protection of Children in an Emergency
and for Conservatorship in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship at 2-3, In re A
Child, No. 2902 (51st Dist. Ct., Schleicher County, Tex. Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Affidavit
in Support of Petition].
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during the investigation, DFPS workers did see many other pregnant
teens with children, many of whom appeared to be underage.3 Investi-
gators reasonably thought that the young girl who identified herself
as Sarah Jessop was among several young pregnant teenagers they
saw during the FLDS raid.4 From the outset of the investigation,
however, DFPS stated that it “was thwarted due to misinformation
about the identities of the girls.” 5 At the end of the two week inves-
tigation, this youth had still not been found, leading some to believe
that a hoax call prompted the entire situation.6
Although the physical and sexual abuse allegations made by
Sarah Jessop could not be substantiated, DFPS investigators saw
twenty teenagers with children, some of whom had become pregnant
between the ages of thirteen and seventeen.7 There were five preg-
nant minors on the ranch who had become pregnant between the ages
of fifteen and seventeen.8 Based on their interviews, DFPS found that
there was “a pattern of girls reporting that there was no age too young
for girls to be ‘spiritually married.’ ” 9 The common belief among the
FLDS was that plural or “celestial” marriage was the only way men
and women could reach the highest kingdom of God.10 The purpose
of the plural marriage was to procreate in order to ensure an “eter-
nal increase.”11 DFPS deemed this belief system to be pervasive, and
3. Id. at 5; Brooke Adams, FLDS Shun Texas Officials Twice at Ranch, SALT LAKE
TRIB., May 22, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 9670236.
4. While searching for Sarah Jessop at the YFZ Ranch, investigators observed that
there were multiple apparently pregnant teens or teenage mothers, several of whom did
not provide identifying information. Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 5.
The difficulty in identifying Sarah Jessop during the search was exacerbated because the
caller who identified herself as such had concluded her final telephone conversation with
authorities by suddenly insisting that she was fine, did not want to get into trouble, and
wanted authorities to forget everything she had said to them. Id. at 4.
5. Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 2, In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective
Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2008) (No. 03-08-00235-CV).
6. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 614 (Tex. 2008)
(per curiam); see Hoaxer’s Phone Linked to Sect Abuse Calls, CBS NEWS, Apr. 24, 2008,
http://cbs3.com/national/rozita.swinton.polygamist.2.707266.html (speculating that the
call was a hoax).
7. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 3-4.
8. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1-*2 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.).
9. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 3.
10. IRWIN ALTMAN & JOSEPH GINAT, POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
26 (1996) (“Another justification for plural marriage was that women needed to be married
or sealed to ‘worthy’ or ‘righteous’ men in order to gain a proper place in heaven.”);
MARTHA SONNTAG BRADLEY, KIDNAPPED FROM THAT LAND: THE GOVERNMENT RAIDS ON
THE SHORT CREEK POLYGAMISTS 2 (1993).
11. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 3; see also ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 10, at 27
(noting that Joseph Smith, the founder of the Mormon faith, purportedly had a revelation
about plural marriage that “emphasized that a righteous man was one who would have
many children and would thereby achieve a godlike status in the hereafter”).
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concluded that all children were at risk of sexual abuse in the house-
hold.12 The YFZ Ranch community was presented to the court as
“essentially one household comprised of extended family subgroups.”13
The DFPS lead investigator further testified that due to this perva-
sive belief system, the male children are groomed to be perpetrators
of sexual abuse and the girls are raised to be victims of sexual abuse.14
The investigation ultimately led to a finding by a local district court
judge that there was a danger to the physical health or safety of the
children caused by their caregivers, and an urgent need for protection
of the children required their immediate removal.15 The court also
found that reasonable efforts were made to eliminate or prevent the
children’s removal, but there was a substantial risk of continuing
danger if the children were returned to the ranch.16 The three-part
emergency removal standard set forth in the Texas Family Code was
satisfied according to District Court Judge Barbara Walther, and the
State of Texas was given temporary managing conservatorship of 468
children,17 the largest number of children to enter any state’s care
at one time through one removal.18
The district court ruling was appealed to the Texas Court of
Appeals through a writ of mandamus by thirty-eight mothers
(Relators) whose children were mostly below the age of thirteen.19
The age of the children removed from the ranch ranged from one
month to seventeen years, and there were some adults removed who
12. Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 5; Petition for Writ of Mandamus,
supra note 5, at 3-4.
13. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2.
14. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 3.
15. See 5 Reporter’s Record at 340, In re A Child, Nos. 2779-2903 (51st Dist. Ct.,
Schleicher County, Tex. Apr. 17-18, 2008) (finding that the elements of section 262 of the
Texas Family Code had been met); accord TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b) (Vernon Supp.
2009) (delineating that the court, prior to issuing an order for conservatorship, must
“find[ ] sufficient evidence to satisfy a person of ordinary prudence and caution that:” the
child’s physical health or safety is endangered; removal is warranted because of an urgent
need for protection; and the state has made reasonable efforts to return the child).
16. See sources cited supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s
finding that the evidence satisfied the requirements of section 262.201).
17. 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 340. DFPS removed some adults who
initially appeared to be under seventeen, but later were shown to be of majority age.
TEX. DEP’T OF FAMILY & PROTECTIVE SERVS., ELDORADO INVESTIGATION: A REPORT FROM
THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES 13 (2008), available at
http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/documents/about/pdf/2008-12-22_Eldorado.pdf [hereinafter
ELDORADO INVESTIGATION]. The total number of children removed was 439. Id. The origi-
nally stated number of 468 will be used throughout this Article notwithstanding the later
clarification by the State of Texas.
18. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 614 (Tex. 2008)
(per curiam).
19. Id. at 615.
2010] THE TEXAS MIS-STEP 453
were thought to be minors because of their youthful appearance.20
Because the primary reason for removal involved the alleged sexual
abuse of the five pregnant female minors ages thirteen to sixteen,
the Relators asserted that their female and male children were not
in immediate danger when they were removed from the YFZ Ranch
due to the fact that they had not reached puberty.21 The Relators also
asserted that none of the five pregnant female minors lived in the
same household as their children.22
In considering the evidence presented, the appellate court held
that DFPS did not show that the Relators’ children were in any phys-
ical danger, stating that “[t]he existence of the FLDS belief system . . .
by itself[ ] does not put children of FLDS parents in physical danger.
It is the imposition of certain alleged tenets of that system on spe-
cific individuals that may put them in physical danger.” 23 The court
of appeals further found that “[e]vidence that children raised in [the
FLDS] environment may someday have their physical health and
safety threatened is not evidence that the danger is imminent enough
to warrant invoking the extreme measure of immediate removal.”24
The court also found that there was no evidence presented that dem-
onstrated any reasonable efforts were made by DFPS “to eliminate
or prevent the removal of [these] children.” 25 The appellate court
vacated the temporary orders, finding that DFPS failed to carry its
burden of proof under the Texas Family Code and abused its discretion
in refusing to return the children to their mothers.26 DFPS petitioned
the Texas Supreme Court, which affirmed the appellate court decision,
stating that removal of the children was not warranted.27
In response to the argument by DFPS that the court of appeals
decision rendered it unable to ensure the children’s safety, the Texas
Supreme Court stated that the Texas Family Code provided the dis-
trict court with “broad authority to protect children short of separat-
ing them from their parents and placing them in foster care.” 28 The
20. See CPS Investigator’s Chart, Petitioner’s Exhibit 26, 7 Reporter’s Record, supra
note 15 (noting that one of the children was born in early March 2008, less than one month
before the raid, and one born in 1991, seventeen years before the raid) [hereinafter CPS
Investigator’s Chart]; ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 13 (implying that the
twenty-six adults were taken because of their youthful appearance).
21. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.).
22. Id. at *3.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at *4.
26. Id.
27. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. 2008)
(per curiam).
28. Id.
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court then gave a list of temporary orders that could have been
entered to preserve the safety and welfare of the children, including
orders to restrain “a party from removing the child beyond a [specific]
geographical area,” remove “an alleged perpetrator from the child’s
home,” and “assist [DFPS] in its investigation.” 29 The court made
clear that the order to vacate the temporary custody orders did not
conclude the Suit Affecting Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) pro-
ceedings.30 The DFPS case would continue after the children had been
returned to their parents, although the reality of the situation was
that the power of the state to safeguard the children was significantly
diminished31 because the parents had regained physical custody of
the children and authority over their care and upbringing.
The failure of the State of Texas in the FLDS case occurred
because it overreached its authority by removing all 468 children
rather than focusing on the facts and circumstances that could have
been substantiated through the removal standard for a select group
of children on the YFZ Ranch.32 Thus, there was a failure on both
sides of the case — harm caused by the unnecessary removal of hun-
dreds of children who were not in immediate danger of abuse and
harm caused by the return of teenage girls who were at risk for sexual
abuse on the ranch. Much speculation was made in the media about
whether the state could have handled the case differently.33 After
analyzing the facts of the case and the Texas legal standard for emer-
gency removal of children, many specific issues surface as to why the
DFPS failed to retain temporary custody of the children who were at
risk of abuse.
In failing to review the precedent established by the Short Creek
Raid in Arizona, DFPS repeated many of the mistakes that the state
agency made in that case.34 The legal arguments of the State of Texas
were flawed in that they centered on the religious belief system of the
FLDS rather than the actual harm to the children who were believed
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 427-
29 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing the state’s ability to remove a child from the home as
“paramount” to protecting the child from harm and abuse).
32. See Michelle Roberts, Texas Seeks Custody of Teen Jeffs Allegedly Wed, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 19, 2008, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/
APStories/stories/D92L1LEO6.html# (discussing the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion
stating that the evidence showed abuse of only a “handful” of the FLDS girls who were
seized).
33. E.g., Bustillo & Riccardi, supra note 1, at 1; John Derbyshire, April Diary: Atrocity
of the Month, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, May 1, 2008, http://www.nationalreview.com (search
“Search NRO” for “Atrocity of the Month”; then follow “April Diary by John Derbyshire”
hyperlink).
34. Bustillo & Riccardi, supra note 1, at 1.
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to have been sexually abused.35 DFPS mistakenly argued that the
families on the YFZ Ranch were all part of one household when, in
fact, the evidence supported that there were many different house-
holds amongst the nineteen residences on the ranch.36 This flawed
argument led to another mistake — failure to provide each set of
parents an individualized due process hearing. Rather than treating
this case like a “class-action removal,” 37 DFPS should have evalu-
ated the parents living in different physical dwellings on their own
merits in regards to whether they abused or neglected their children
or any of the children in their direct care and custody.
With regard to the evidence presented by the state, it is unclear
but suspected that there was more evidence available to show in-
stances of abuse and neglect than could be admitted in district court.38
Based on what was presented however, the state proffered no evi-
dence of the child victim from the initial DFPS referral.39 The evi-
dence that was presented regarding the alleged sexual abuse victims,
the pregnant minors, and the minors who already had children on the
ranch, arguably satisfied the low burden set forth for removal in the
Texas Family Code,40 but it was very poorly laid out. Neither the
pregnant minors nor the minors with children located on the YFZ
Ranch made an outcry of sexual abuse.41 Because the established
methods of interviewing child victims and witnesses of child abuse
or neglect did not work with this population of children, the state
caseworkers and interviewers had a difficult task in developing trust
with a group of children who were taught to fear and avoid “evil”
35. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.).
36. Id. at *2, *3 n.10.
37. Roberts, supra note 1, at 7C.
38. See Lead Texas CPS Attorneys Resign: Disagreement on Handling FLDS Cases,
POLYGAMY: NEWS & VIEWS FROM THE CHILD PROTECTION PROJECT, June 2009, at 1, 3
(reporting that two CPS attorneys felt that the YFZ cases were being dropped too fast,
in contravention of typical CPS procedure); Jordan Smith, More FLDS Woes for CPS,
AUSTIN CHRON., Oct. 31, 2008, available at http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/
Issue/story?oid=oid:696857 (noting that Gary Banks, lead counsel for CPS, and Charles
Childress, head of the agency’s San Angelo legal team, resigned from their jobs with CPS,
“prompting speculation that Childress might not be pleased with the way things have
gone”).
39. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 613-14 (Tex. 2008)
(per curiam).
40. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (stating that the court
need not order the return of a child removed from his or her parents if it “finds sufficient
evidence to satisfy a person of ordinary prudence and caution that . . . there was a danger
to [the child’s] physical health or safety”).
41. See 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 275-77 (suggesting that Ms. Voss, the
testifying witness, could not identify a time when any minor made an allegation of
sexual abuse).
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outsiders.42 The pregnant teens also may have been afraid that their
spiritual husbands would be arrested if they identified them.43 There-
fore, there was no sexual abuse outcry by a child implicating an adult
as the perpetrator. Texas had to connect the dots to determine which
teenage mothers were spiritually married to which spiritual husbands
and, in some cases, even which children belonged to these mothers.44
The Texas Family Code and child welfare policy are inadequate
to protect all abused children. Part of the reason that the state could
not meet its burden of proof was because the state law only provides
for removal when children face “a danger to the[ir] physical health
or safety.” 45 Children who are alleged to have been “conditioned” or
psychologically maltreated are not protected by the current state re-
moval standard.46 This is the case for approximately half the states
in the country.47 The impact of psychological abuse and its inclusion
in emergency child removal statutes is an important revelation of
the Texas FLDS case.
Since the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in May 2008, all
of the children have been returned to their mothers.48 The media
coverage has been less than neutral throughout the ongoing case,
ranging from condemnation of child brides and sexual abuse to de-
fense of the outlier group to maintain their polygamous lifestyle.49
42. Terri Langford, Sect Youths Conditioned to Deceive Outsiders, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Apr. 10, 2008, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/5688909.html.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 50-52 (discussing the criminal cases that
followed the child welfare cases).
44. See, e.g., CPS Investigation Summary: Rachel Keate, Petitioner’s Exhibit 4, 6
Reporter’s Record, supra note 15 (illustrating the fact that Rachel Keate was evasive as
to whether and to whom she was spiritually married and also denied being the mother
of her child); CPS Investigation Summary: Marilyn Keate, Petitioner’s Exhibit 18, 7
Reporter’s Record, supra note 15 (showing that Marilyn Keate refused to identify her
children for the investigator).
45. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
46. See id. § 262.201(b)(1), (d) (providing that the court considers only the physical
health or safety and not the psychological health or safety of the child when deciding
whether removal is warranted).
47. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 3 (2007), http://
www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/define.pdf; see also Celia Doyle,
Emotional Abuse of Children: Issues for Intervention, 6 CHILD ABUSE REV. 330, 330-31
(1997) (noting the various terms used to describe the emotional abuse of children).
48. Ben Winslow, All FLDS Children Returned to Parents, DESERET NEWS, June 5,
2008, at A08.
49. See, e.g., Ben Winslow, FLDS, Pro-polygamy Group Meet, DESERET NEWS, June 25,
2008, at A10 (interviewing a strongly supportive member of a pro-polygamy group);
Marci A. Hamilton, Taking Stock of the 2008 Intervention at the Texas Fundamentalist
Latter-Day Saints Compound on its One-Year Anniversary: The Lessons We Must Learn
to Effectively Protect Children in the Future, FINDLAW, Apr. 16, 2009, http://writ.news
.findlaw.com/hamilton/20090416.html (using vivid language to depict the leader of the
ranch as a child molester).
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The Attorney General of Texas has now turned to the criminal courts
to deal with the abuses of children revealed in the Texas raid.50 The
state has indicted twelve men on charges related to underage mar-
riages at the YFZ Ranch, including sexual assault of a child, conduct-
ing an unlawful marriage ceremony involving a minor, bigamy, and
failure to report child abuse.51 The trials began in the fall of 2009
before the same judge that ruled on the DFPS case, and the first
FLDS sect member has been convicted of sexual assault of a child and
sentenced to ten years in prison and an $8000 fine.52 In addition, the
Texas Legislature has attempted to pass some new laws that are
related to the FLDS case and the procedural quandary in which the
court found itself.53 While the states of Utah and Arizona have at-
tempted to work cooperatively with their respective FLDS commu-
nities,54 Texas is in “Don’t Mess with Texas” mode.55 With recent
stiffer sentencing guidelines for child sex abusers in Texas,56 it may
be wise for the FLDS to watch their feet.
Part I of this Article sets forth the specific facts of the Texas
FLDS case, the fourteen-day hearing, and the Texas appellate and
supreme court review of the lower court decision. Part II provides a
historical background of the Short Creek Raid of 1953, a state inves-
tigation which involved the removal of 263 children from an FLDS
50. Brian West, Texas City Awaiting Next Phase of Case, DESERET NEWS, June 8,
2008, at A02.
51. Michelle Roberts, Texas Attorney General Attends Polygamy Trial, DESERET NEWS,
Dec. 9, 2009, at A07; News Release, Greg Abbott, Statement by Texas Attorney General
Greg Abbott (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://www.oag.stat.tx.us/oagNews/release.php
?print=1&id=2569.
52. Michelle Roberts, Polygamist Guilty of Sexual Assault, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov.
6, 2009, at A1; Texas Polygamist Sect Member Sentenced to 10 Years in Prison for Sexual
Assault of a Child, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Ontario), Nov. 10, 2009, at 61; see also Brooke
Adams, Second Trial Begins for Polygamist Charged with Sexual Assault of a Child,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 8, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 24726377 (noting that the second
man to be tried in a case deriving from the raid is, like Raymond M. Jessop, being tried
before Judge Walther).
53. Nathan Bernier, Lawmakers Investigating Past CPS Actions, KUTNEWS, Mar. 11,
2009, http://www.publicbroadcasting.net/kera/news.newsmain?action=article&ARTICLE
_ID=1479830&sectionID-1.
54. See Faye Bowers, States Divided on Approach to Polygamous Sect, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 5, 2008, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/content/
view/print/226828v (describing a 2003 “summit” between the Utah and Arizona attorneys
general and the FLDS communities in the border region). Utah has gone as far as to
issue a so-called “polygamy primer . . . as part of its outreach to polygamous groups.”
Brooke Adams, Tip Sheet on Sect Raises Ire: FLDS Attorney Cites Bias, Stereotypes, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Apr. 23, 2008, available at http://www.reporternews.com/news/2008/apr/23/
tip-sheet-on-sect-raises-ire/?print=1.
55. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 54 (describing “the more interventionist approach
of Texas in cracking down on the breakaway Mormon sect”).
56. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(f) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
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remote enclave in Arizona.57 Part III of this Article presents a case
analysis of the Texas legal standard for emergency child removals, the
due process hearing, and the subsequent appellate process. Part III
also identifies the primary reason for the failure of the Child Protec-
tive Services (CPS) emergency child removal and divides this reason
into four sub-parts. Part IV contemplates some additional factors that
may have made a difference in the outcome of the case. The Conclu-
sion describes how the case has proceeded since the children were
returned to their parents and provides final thoughts on the efficacy
of the case as a whole.
I. CASE BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
A. Facts of Case
On March 29, 2008, a referral was called in to the DFPS CPS
hotline by staff members at a local family violence shelter, stating
that a sixteen-year-old pregnant mother sought to leave the YFZ
Ranch because she was being hit and raped by her forty-nine-year-
old spiritual husband.58 She advised that she was “brought to the
YFZ Ranch by her parents three years ago,” and two years after her
arrival, “she was spiritually married to an adult male member of the
church.” 59 The teenager reported that her husband would beat her
when he was angry, including “hitting her in the chest and choking
her.” 60 The last time she was beaten was on Easter Sunday 2008.61
The caller also stated that during a previous altercation, her husband
had beaten her with such severity that he had broken several of her
ribs, resulting in a visit to the hospital.62 “She reported that the doctor
wrapped her torso in an ace bandage and told her to ‘take it easy for
a few days.’ ” 63 The caller further stated that her husband would
harm her by “forc[ing] himself on her sexually.” 64 This young woman
had called the shelter several times that day requesting assistance
for her and her eight-month-old daughter to leave their current living
situation.65 She advised that “she was not allowed to leave the YFZ
Ranch, unless it was to receive medical care,” and even then she
57. See discussion infra Part I.
58. Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 2-3.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2-3.
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would be accompanied by other members of the ranch.66 She indicated
that the man to whom she was spiritually married was also married
to several other women, and she was his seventh wife.67 The caller
“stated that her parents [did] not live on the YFZ Ranch and that
she [had] not had any contact with them to explain that she [did] not
want to continue to be on the ranch.” 68
On March 30, 2008, the teenaged mother contacted the shelter
again, stating that she was “married in a spiritual union” to a man
who had three other wives residing on the YFZ Ranch.69 She reported
that her husband had “gone away for a while to the ‘outsider’s world,’
but she said she did not know why he left the ranch.” 70 During this
conversation, the young woman “indicated that she was being held
against her will at the YFZ Ranch and church members had told her
that if she tried to leave, she [would] be found and locked up.” 71
Church members also informed her that if she left YFZ Ranch, “out-
siders [would] hurt her, force her to cut her hair, to wear make up
[sic] and clothes[,] and to have sex with lots of men.” 72 She further
stated “that her parents, who had returned to their hometown outside
the State, were preparing to send her [fifteen] year old sister to live
at the YFZ Ranch.” 73 At the end of the conversation, the caller “began
crying and . . . stated that she [was] happy and fine[,] and [did] not
want to get into trouble.” 74 She concluded by stating that “everything
she had previously said should be forgotten.” 75
DFPS determined that these facts warranted an investigation
to locate the teenager and her infant child.76 Any referral regarding
sexual abuse of a child is a “priority one” call for DFPS, requiring
investigators and police to respond within twenty-four hours.77 Since
66. Id. at 3.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 3-4.
70. Id. at 4.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.301(d)(2) (Vernon 2008) (requiring DFPS to “assign
priorities and prescribe investigative procedures for investigations based on the severity
and immediacy of the alleged harm to the child”); Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs.,
Child Protective Services, Investigations, http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/Child_Protection/
About_Child_Protective_Services/investigation.asp#priorities (last visited Feb. 7, 2010)
[hereinafter DFPS Investigations] (explaining that “[p]riority [one] reports include all
reports of children who appear to face an immediate risk of abuse or neglect that could
result in death or serious harm,” and that “[i]nvestigations of these reports must be
initiated within [twenty-four] hours of receiving the call report”).
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the state of Texas conducts joint investigations of child abuse and
neglect pursuant to the Texas Family Code, both DFPS and law en-
forcement collaborated in order to conduct an effective investigation
on the YFZ Ranch.78 On Thursday, April 3, 2008, DFPS filed a Petition
for Orders in Aid of Investigation of a Report of Child Abuse or Neglect
with the 51st District Court, and Judge Barbara Walther issued an
Order allowing DFPS on the property of the YFZ Ranch.79 The order
also allowed for the transporting and interviewing of children at the
YFZ Ranch.80 Law enforcement entered the ranch on April 3 and se-
cured the ranch so that DFPS investigators could begin interviewing
residents and children.81
The first interviews with underage girls at the ranch revealed
a pattern of underage girls being “spiritually united” with adult men
and having children with the men.82 Numerous girls had small chil-
dren, and girls told investigators that marriages could occur at any
age.83 Investigators also observed a pattern of deceit in the first inter-
views, including “children [being] moved from location to location in
an apparent attempt to prevent investigators from talking to them.” 84
“Women and children [also] frequently said they could not answer
questions about the ages of girls or family relationships.” 85 “When
an investigator asked one girl how old she was, she looked at her
husband,” who said, “ ‘[y]ou’re [eighteen].’ ” 86 The girl then informed
investigators that she was eighteen years old.87 “Other school-aged
children and teens would provide only first names and said they [did
not] know their birthdates[,] or had been told by their parents not
to answer questions.” 88
DFPS investigators identified twenty-seven girls who stated that
they were fourteen to seventeen years old.89 Some of the teenage girls
78. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.3011 (Vernon 2008); Affidavit in Support of Petition,
supra note 2, at 4-5.
79. Order for Investigation of Child Abuse, In re S.J., No. 2778 (51st Dist. Ct.,
Schleicher County, Tex. Apr. 3, 2008); Petition for Orders in Aid of Investigation of a
Report of Child Abuse or Neglect, In re S.J., No. 2778 (51st Dist. Ct., Schleicher County,
Tex. Apr. 3, 2008) [hereinafter Petition for Orders in Aid of Investigation].
80. Order for Investigation of Child Abuse, supra note 79, at 1-2.
81. Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 4-5.
82. ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 3, 6.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., DFPS Provides Senate Committee with
Eldorado Update, http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/About/News/2008/2008-04-30_Eldorado
_Senate.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Eldorado Update to Senate].
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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stated that they knew a sixteen-year-old Sarah Jessop who had a
child, but did not know where she was located.90 Furthermore:
There [were] an additional [twenty-six] girls who . . . provided con-
flicting information about their ages, at some points indicating
they [were] minors and at other times saying they [were] adults.
Of these [fifty-three] girls, more than [thirty] [had] children, [were]
pregnant, or both. Six of these girls [had] two children, and two
[had] three children.91
In addition to the suspected sexual abuse of girls on the ranch, DFPS
investigated the possible sexual abuse of some young boys “[b]ased
on interviews with the children and journal entries found at the
ranch.” 92 Finally, DFPS found “[m]edical exams and reports by the
children [that] indicated that at least [forty-one] children . . . had
broken bones in the past.” 93 Although DFPS did not have complete
medical information on many children or x-rays, this was “cause for
concern and something [it wanted to] continue to examine.” 94
On Friday, April 4, 2008, DFPS “took temporary legal custody of
[eighteen] girls (ages [six] months to [seventeen] years) after investi-
gators concluded they had been abused or were in imminent risk of
future abuse.” 95 Subsequently, thirty-four other girls were taken to
an Eldorado civic center “for further questioning to determine if they
had been abused or were at risk of abuse,” and another eighty-five
children were later transported to the civic center for questioning.96
On Saturday, April 5, 2008, DFPS “continued interviewing the chil-
dren at the civic center and the ranch,” calling in additional “special
investigators from around the state to assist.” 97 By Sunday, April 6,
2008, there were 246 children and 93 women in DFPS care, and DFPS
“continued to work with law enforcement to locate children at the
ranch and bring them to the shelters in San Angelo.” 98 A centralized
90. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 177-78. According to the Bishop’s Family
Record, there were two teenagers between sixteen and seventeen named Sarah Jessop,
but they were not married to anyone named Dan Barlow who was middle-aged. Bishop’s
Record, Petitioner’s Exhibit 4, 6 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15 [hereinafter Bishop’s
Record].
91. Eldorado Update to Senate, supra note 86.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., Overview of the Investigation — Eldorado,
Texas, As of April 28, 2008, Chronology and Status Report, http://www.dfps.state.tx
.us/About/News/2008/2008-04-28_chronology.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2010) [hereinafter
Chronology and Status Report].
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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shelter was established at the Fort Concho complex after the Gov-
ernor’s Division of Emergency Management activated a mass care
plan.99 It was not until Monday, April 7, 2008, that DFPS filed its
Original Petition for Protection of Children in an Emergency and for
Conservatorship in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship.100
On the same day that the Original Petition was filed, “Judge
Barbara Walthers [sic] granted DFPS temporary legal custody of all
401 children in the shelter in San Angelo” after determining that
“some of the[ ] children had been sexually and physically abused and
the rest [of the children were] at risk of abuse” if they returned to
their homes.101 “[Fifteen] more children were transported to the shel-
ter [on April 7, 2008], bringing the total number of children in state
custody to 416.”102 The fourteen-day adversarial hearing was set for
April 17, 2008, to determine if the children should remain in state
care.103 Judge Walther issued several orders prior to the hearing on
April 17, including an order for DFPS to keep all the removed chil-
dren in the San Angelo area and outside the foster care system until
the fourteen-day hearing, and an order for DFPS “to confiscate the
cell phones of the 139 women [in the shelter] to prevent witnesses
[sic] tampering and interference with the legal process.”104
On Monday, April 14, 2008, DFPS decided to separate the chil-
dren from the mothers who were in the shelter.105 “Adult women with
very young children were provided the opportunity to remain at the
shelter. The other women were given the choice to return to the YFZ
Ranch or to a safe place. . . . [A]ttorneys of the children, mental health
professionals[,] and others” weighed in on DFPS’s decision to par-
tially separate the mothers from their children, and Judge Walther
concurred.106 On April 16, several hundred attorneys ad litem for the
children and women were given the opportunity to meet with their
clients in the San Angelo Coliseum.107 The fourteen-day hearing began
at 9:00 A.M. on Thursday, April 17, 2008, with Judge Walther presid-
ing, and concluded that night at 9:00 P.M.108 The next morning, the
fourteen-day hearing resumed at 9:30 A.M., and concluded by the
99. Id.
100. Original Petition for Protection of Children in an Emergency and for Conser-
vatorship in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, In re 330 Children from the
YFZ Ranch, No. 2902 (51st Dist. Ct., Schleicher County, Tex. Apr. 7, 2008).
101. Chronology and Status Report, supra note 95.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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end of the day with a decision in favor of DFPS to retain temporary
custody of all of the children.109
B. Child Removal Standard
Texas law allows the state to exercise its rights under the parens
patriae doctrine with or without a court order, depending on the cir-
cumstances of the children at risk.110 When DFPS files an initial suit
requesting permission from the court to take possession of a child
without prior notice to the parents and an evidentiary hearing, its
burden of proof is low. The facts must be “sufficient to satisfy a person
of ordinary prudence and caution,”111 which is a lower burden than
preponderance of the evidence. The state must show through a sworn
affidavit by a person with personal knowledge that:
(1) there is an immediate danger to the physical health or safety
of the child or the child has been a victim of neglect or sexual
abuse and that continuation in the home would be contrary
to the child’s welfare;
(2) there is no time, consistent with the physical health or safety
of the child, for a full adversary hearing . . . ; and
(3) reasonable efforts, consistent with the circumstances and
providing for the safety of the child, were made to prevent
or eliminate the need for the removal of the child.112
Section 262.101 of the Texas Family Code applies when there
is time to file a petition and affidavit before taking actual possession
of the child.113 This section did not apply to the circumstances pre-
sented at the YFZ Ranch. The call that came into the CPS Hotline
was a “priority one” referral,114 which meant that CPS was required
to respond within twenty-four hours of the referral.115 After the call
109. Id.
110. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.001(a) (Vernon 2008) (stating that when the govern-
ment has an interest in the child, it may file suit to take possession of the child or take
the child without an order, as long as the taking is done in accordance with the Code);
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 57 (1890) (“[P]arens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State . . . . for
the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.”); see also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009) (defining parens patriae as the capacity of a state to
provide protection to those who cannot protect themselves).
111. § 262.101.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for a
priority one referral).
115. § 261.301(d)(2); see also ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 6 (explaining
that the call received on the DFPS hotline alleged physical and sexual abuse, and that
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came in on March 29, 2008, the joint investigation between the
sheriff’s office and the Department of Public Safety (DPS) began its
attempt to locate Sarah Barlow, also known as Sarah Jessop, the
caller to the local family violence shelter.116 Within five days, CPS
determined that some of the teenage girls had been sexually abused
or were in imminent risk of future sexual abuse.117 These children
were taken into custody without court order on Friday, April 4, 2008,
while CPS continued its investigation.118
The section that CPS turned to in order to take emergency pos-
session of the first set of children without a court order was Texas
Family Code section 262.104.119 This section provides that DFPS, “a
Texas law requires DFPS to investigate in that situation); DFPS Investigations, supra
note 77 (stating that reports of an immediate risk of physical or sexual abuse qualify as
priority one reports).
116. ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 6; see also Petition for Orders in Aid
of Investigation, supra note 79, at 1 (disclosing that the caller was Sarah Jessop, also
known as Sarah Barlow).
117. ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 6.
118. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 613-14 (Tex. 2008)
(per curiam); see also ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 6 (discussing the
removal without a court order of eighteen girls on Apr. 4, 2008).
119. § 262.104. The six conditions set forth in this section to justify removing a child
without a court order are:
(1) on personal knowledge of facts that would lead a person of ordinary
prudence and caution to believe that there is an immediate danger to the
physical health or safety of the child;
(2) on information furnished by another that has been corroborated by
personal knowledge of facts and all of which taken together would lead a
person of ordinary prudence and caution to believe that there is an immediate
danger to the physical health or safety of the child;
(3) on personal knowledge of facts that would lead a person of ordinary
prudence and caution to believe that the child has been the victim of sexual
abuse;
(4) on information furnished by another that has been corroborated by
personal knowledge of facts and all of which taken together would lead a
person of ordinary prudence and caution to believe that the child has been
the victim of sexual abuse; or
(5) on information furnished by another that has been corroborated by
personal knowledge of facts and all of which taken together would lead a
person of ordinary prudence and caution to believe that the parent or person
who has possession of the child is currently using a controlled substance as
defined by Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code, and the use constitutes an
immediate danger to the physical health and safety of the child.
Id. § 262.104(a) (emphasis added).
A sixth condition is set forth in subsection (b) that pertains to:
personal knowledge or information furnished by another, that has been
corroborated by personal knowledge, that would lead a person of ordinary
prudence and caution to believe that the parent or person who has possession
of the child has permitted the child to remain on premises used for the
manufacture of methamphetamine.
Id. § 262.104(b).
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law enforcement officer, or a juvenile probation officer may take
possession of a child without a court order,” if “there is no time to
obtain a temporary restraining order or attachment before taking
possession of a child consistent with the health and safety of that
child.”120 The difference between this section and section 262.201 is
that DFPS does not have to prove three elements prior to taking tem-
porary possession of the child.121 Under section 262.104, DFPS only
has to show that one out of six conditions exists in order to prove that
emergency possession is warranted.122 Texas was able to show that
condition four123 existed because the investigators had witnessed what
they thought were over thirty female minors with children and/or
expecting children,124 collected family information from the Bishop’s
Record,125 and interviewed the teenage girls with children as well as
the pregnant teenagers.126 The information furnished by the children
along with their own personal knowledge led them to believe several
of the female children had been victims of sexual abuse.127
Since the legal standard under section 262.104 is much lower
than the legal standard established for the required initial hearing
to be held the next business day after the removal and the fourteen-
day hearing,128 DFPS knew it eventually would have to meet a higher
legal standard. The subtle differences in the statutes governing re-
moval of children should not be overlooked: they illustrate why CPS
was able to push forward with the allegations of abuse and subsequent
120. Id. § 262.104(a).
121. Compare id. § 262.104(a) with § 262.201(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (requiring DFPS
to prove that the child’s health or safety is in danger, immediate removal is warranted,
and that reasonable efforts to return the child have been made in order to keep the child
after the fourteen-day adversarial hearing).
122. § 262.104.
123. See § 262.104(a)(4) (allowing DFPS to take possession of a child “on information
furnished by another that has been corroborated by personal knowledge of facts and all
of which taken together would lead a person of ordinary prudence and caution to believe
that the child has been the victim of sexual abuse”).
124. See Chronology and Status Report, supra note 95 (noting that DFPS took over
thirty girls that investigators thought had been abused or were in imminent danger of
being abused).
125. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., Statement on Third Court of Appeals
Ruling, http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/about/news/2008/eldorado/2008-05-22_statement.asp
(last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
126. Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that investigators
found many teenagers who were pregnant or already had children during the course of
the investigation, and believed from interviews with the children that there was a per-
vasive practice of young women having sexual relations with older men on the ranch).
127. See id. (noting that the investigators interviewed children and took note of the
pregnant minors and minors with children in making their determination that the
children on the ranch should be removed).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 119-27 (discussing the differences between
§§ 262.104 and 262.201).
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investigative findings, despite how sparse the evidence presented at
the fourteen-day hearing appeared. CPS, knowing it would need more
evidence for subsequent hearings, first filed a petition with the court
to obtain an order that would aid in its investigation of the report of
child abuse or neglect.129 The court order on April 3, 2008, granted
DFPS the right to search the YFZ Ranch prior to filing its emergency
removal petition,130 and gave DFPS access to records it hoped would
suffice as proof of underage spiritual marriages between older men
and minor girls.
The state must still go before the district court to obtain an order
after it has taken possession of children without a court order.131 The
hearing is typically ex parte and must be held “on or before the first
working day after the date the child is taken into possession.”132 This
hearing took place on Monday, April 7, 2008.133 The legal standard
at this hearing is very similar to the three-pronged standard set
forth in section 262.101,134 except that there is more of an emphasis
placed on the issue of sexual abuse. Pursuant to Texas Family Code
section 262.107, the court shall order the return of the child at the
initial hearing unless the court is satisfied that:
(1) there is a continuing danger to the physical health or safety
of the child if the child is returned to the parent, managing
conservator, possessory conservator, guardian, caretaker,
or custodian who is presently entitled to possession of the
child or the evidence shows that the child has been the victim
of sexual abuse on one or more occasions and that there is
a substantial risk that the child will be the victim of sexual
abuse in the future;
(2) continuation of the child in the home would be contrary to
the child’s welfare; and
(3) reasonable efforts, consistent with the circumstances and
providing for the safety of the child, were made to prevent
or eliminate the need for removal of the child.135
Section 262.107 contains a subsection (b) which addresses what the
court can consider in determining whether there is a continuing
129. Petition for Orders in Aid of Investigation, supra note 79, at 1-3.
130. Order for Investigation of Child Abuse, supra note 79, at 1; Petition for Orders
in Aid of Investigation, supra note 79, at 1-3.
131. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.107 (Vernon 2008).
132. Id. § 262.106 (a)-(b).
133. Chronology and Status Report, supra note 95.
134. See § 262.101 (requiring the government to prove that the child’s health or safety
is in immediate danger, that there is no time for a full adversarial hearing, and that the
government has made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the
child).
135. Id. § 262.107(a).
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danger to the physical health or safety of a child.136 Subsection (b)
provides that “the court may consider whether the household to which
the child would be returned includes a person who has: (1) abused or
neglected another child in a manner that caused serious injury to or
the death of the other child; or (2) sexually abused another child.”137
It is important to understand the burden that DFPS had to
meet in order to initially take the children into state custody, and
how the affidavit provided with the original petition138 was the only
evidence the judge had to consider regarding the emergency possession
of children.139 The phrasing of the affidavit of CPS supervisor Lynn
McFadden enabled the fact finder (Judge Walther) to determine
that a person of ordinary prudence and caution would find that the
some of the children on the ranch had been the victim of sexual abuse
and that these children were at substantial risk of being sexual abuse
victims in the future.140 CPS combined three sets of facts together to
establish the “continuing danger to the physical health or safety of
the child[ren].”141
The first fact was the referral from a pregnant sixteen-year-old
mother of an eight-month-old who had made very serious allegations
of physical and sexual abuse by her forty-nine-year-old spiritual hus-
band.142 Based on the ages given by Sarah at the time of her call to
the shelter — that she was sixteen years old and her child was eight
months old — she could have been “spiritually” married and conceived
her child at the age of fourteen, depending on her date of birth.143 The
facts given by Sarah indicated that (a) she was the victim of domestic
violence and sexual assault, and (b) her parents had abandoned her
or left her in an environment that endangered her physical safety
and well-being (both grounds for termination of parental rights in
the Texas Family Code).144 Although CPS was unable to locate Sarah
136. Id. § 262.107(b).
137. Id.
138. Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2.
139. See § 262.101 (requiring only an affidavit when the government files a petition
before taking possession of a child).
140. See Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 5-6 (describing the numerous
teenage mothers and pregnant teenagers on the ranch).
141. § 262.107; Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 2-6.
142. Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 2-3.
143. This suggestion assumes a normal nine month gestation period, plus the age of
the child, which equals seventeen months. If Sarah had only recently turned sixteen years
old at the time of her call to the shelter, seventeen months earlier she would have been
only fourteen years old. But see Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 3 (estimat-
ing that Sarah Jessop was fifteen years old at the time of her spiritual marriage to her hus-
band, notwithstanding her stated age of sixteen years and her child’s age of eight months).
144. § 161.001(1)(D)-(E); see Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 3 (indicat-
ing that the caller was being beaten and raped by her husband, and that her parents had
left her at the ranch at the age of thirteen and had not been in touch with her since).
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Jessop, also known as Sarah Barlow, or her baby, its investigators
were able to see firsthand very young pregnant teenagers as well as
very young girls who already had children.145 This fact, combined
with testimony that many of the young girls admitted to knowing a
sixteen-year-old Sarah Jessop who had a baby,146 gave rise to suspi-
cions about whether Sarah was being hidden and protected, or per-
haps just providing a different name to investigators so that she
could not be identified.
The second fact that CPS established was that there were a
number of young teenaged girls who appeared to be pregnant as
well as several teenaged girls who reported to the Department that
they had already given birth and had infant children.147 This fact was
shown through the CPS investigators seeing young girls with chil-
dren and assessing their approximate ages and physical condition
of pregnancy through interviews.148 The third fact set forth by CPS
was the cultural and moral climate on the YFZ Ranch whereby under-
age girls were conditioned to anticipate and acquiesce to spiritual
marriage and sexual activity with adult men on the ranch.149 This
third fact gave rise to the possible abusive and criminal nature of
the second fact, and CPS drew the causal connection at the fourteen-
day hearing that the teenage girls were spiritually married to older
men who had sexually abused them, proof of which were the children
born of their unions and the children yet to be born.150
Without the names of husbands, dates of births, and dates of
marriages, however, no corroboration of this causal connection could
be verified by CPS investigators until later in the investigation pro-
cess.151 Rather than focus on the polygamist aspect of the FLDS life-
style like the State of Arizona did in the 1953 Short Creek Raid,152 the
State of Texas aimed to address the reason that the investigation
began in the first place — child sexual abuse. In applying the burden
of proof required for these cases at this stage, CPS was able to meet
the requirements for a person of ordinary prudence and caution at
145. Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 5; Ben Winslow, FLDS Are Still
Feeling Effects One Year Later, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 29, 2009, at A01.
146. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 178.
147. Id. at 192, 201; Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 5.
148. See Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that the investigators
thought the girls “appeared” pregnant).
149. Petition for Orders in Aid of Investigation, supra note 79, at 1.
150. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 192, 201, 204-06.
151. See ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 7 (discussing the difficulty in
verifying the ages and relationships of the girls and men at the ranch).
152. See infra text accompanying notes 295-331 (discussing the Short Creek Raid in
depth).
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the trial level, but the appellate and supreme courts did not view the
facts in the same light.153
Hundreds of other children on the YFZ Ranch who were not part
of this group of teenage mothers were also removed from the ranch.154
In a case where siblings of an alleged victim of sexual abuse reside
in the same household as the victim, the Texas Family Code allows
the court to consider this sexual abuse when determining whether
there is an immediate danger to the physical health and safety of the
siblings.155 If DFPS could establish that every child on the ranch had
a sister who was an underage pregnant teen or teenage mother (and
therefore a victim of sexual abuse), this statute could justify their
removal as well.156 Herein lays the rationale behind claiming that all
the children were part of one household — tying them together would
link the immediate danger for some of the children to all of the chil-
dren. It is a well-established principle in child abuse scholarship that
in families where one child bears the brunt of the parent’s abuse, the
other children are at risk of abuse and are considered collateral vic-
tims.157 Also, since DFPS claimed that it was difficult to determine
who lived in what building, the theory that all of the children were
part of one household initially worked in its favor to obtain authori-
zation from the court for temporary possession of all 468 children.158
C. Due Process Hearing
The fourteen-day due process hearing began on April 17 and
lasted only two days.159 Texas Family Code section 262.201 provides
that “a full adversarial hearing shall be held not later than the
[fourteenth] day after the date the child [is] taken into possession by
the governmental entity.”160 Prior to the hearing, the coordinating
153. ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 8-9.
154. Id. at 3; Chronology and Status Report, supra note 95.
155. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.102(b)(2) (Vernon 2008) (“In determining whether
there is an immediate danger to the physical health or safety of a child, the court may
consider whether the child’s household includes a person who has . . . sexually abused
another child.”).
156. Id.
157. Elizabeth A.W. Seagull, Family Assessment, in THE BATTERED CHILD 150, 154
(Mary Edna Helfer, Ruth S. Kempe & Richard D. Krugman eds., 5th ed. 1997); see also
Heather Forkey et al., After the Call: Children and the Child Welfare System, in
RECOGNITION OF CHILD ABUSE FOR THE MANDATED REPORTER 351, 356 (Angelo P.
Giardino & Eileen R. Giardino eds., 3d ed. 2002) (noting that if one child is believed to
be in immediate danger, usually all children are removed).
158. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1-*4 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.).
159. 4-5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15.
160. § 262.201(a).
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attorneys ad litem assigned the children’s attorneys to color coded
groups for the children according to “commonalit[ies] of issues and
interests.”161 It was very clear that this hearing was going to be “en
masse” in that the pleadings and testimony of CPS applied to all the
children and parents that resided on the YFZ Ranch.162 Several of
the children’s attorneys objected as to the format of the hearing and
asserted constitutional due process and statutory violations because
each child was not being provided a full adversarial hearing where
they were given the opportunity to present evidence on their own be-
half.163 Judge Walther declared that these objections were premature
and that it was the court’s intention to allow the attorneys the oppor-
tunity to call witnesses and present evidence.164 The court repeatedly
set forth that the state statute required that the hearing must be
held within fourteen days of the children’s removal.165
CPS had the burden of proving three elements under Texas
Family Code section 262.201(b) with “sufficient evidence to satisfy
a person of ordinary prudence and caution.”166 The State of Texas
had to show that there was: (1) a danger to the physical health or
safety of the children; (2) an urgent need for immediate removal of
the children and a reasonable effort made to prevent the removal of
the children; and (3) a reasonable effort made to enable the child to
return home.167
CPS put on its case in chief with four witnesses: Marc Allen
Connelly, the Deputy General Counsel for the Texas Department of
State Health Services; Danny Crawford, a sergeant with the Motor
Vehicle Theft Service for the Department of Public Safety; Angie Voss,
a CPS Investigative Supervisor; and Dr. Bruce Perry, a child psychi-
atrist, licensed physician, and nationally known expert in child mal-
treatment and child development.168 The Respondent parents on the
161. 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 109.
162. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 15.
163. Id. at 12-13, 16.
164. Id. at 14.
165. See, e.g., id. at 15 (pointing out that the Texas Family Code requires a hearing to
be held within fourteen days); 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 337 (same); see also
§ 262.201 (Vernon Supp. 2009) (requiring an adversarial hearing within fourteen days
after the state removes a child).
166. See § 262.201(b) (requiring that the court order the return of the child to his or
her parents unless evidence is presented that is sufficient to satisfy a person of ordinary
prudence and caution that removal is the best option).
167. Id.
168. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 24, 48, 147; 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note
15, at 57-58. The court reporter spelled Marc Connelly’s name incorrectly in the court
transcript. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 24. The text of this Article utilizes the
correct spelling.
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YFZ Ranch offered testimony through four mothers and an expert wit-
ness in the Mormon and FLDS religions, Dr. William John Walsh.169
Dr. Perry testified that the pregnancy of the underage children
on the YFZ Ranch was the result of sexual abuse because children of
the age of fourteen, fifteen, or sixteen are not sufficiently emotion-
ally mature to enter a healthy consensual sexual relationship or
marriage.170 When questioned by the children’s attorney of the pink
group, who represented girls under the age of five, Dr. Perry admitted
that it was probably unhealthier for children in that age group to be
removed from a parent than be exposed to the FLDS lifestyle.171 Dr.
Walsh confirmed that the FLDS accepts the age of first menstruation
as the age of eligibility for marriage and that there was no sex out-
side of marriage within the FLDS.172
The twenty-five exhibits that were filed to support the case
against the FLDS parents by the State of Texas included state health
records for three teenage mothers, the Bishop’s Record, CPS investi-
gation summaries for nineteen women, and the CPS Investigator’s
Chart.173 The health records were entered to show that there were
three teenagers who had given birth before the age of eighteen, and
at least one of these young women likely was pregnant at the age of
fifteen.174 The evidence presented through the exhibits was just as
important for what it did not show. The health records of the teenage
girls did not reflect who the fathers of their children were or if the
girls had made an outcry of sexual assault or abuse prior to giving
birth.175 The Bishop’s Record did not state the age of the wives at the
time of marriage, and in most cases, it did not reflect which child
169. 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 167-68, 247-49, 270, 285, 297-98.
170. Id. at 72-73.
171. Id. at 156.
172. Id. at 174, 183, 200-01.
173. 6 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 2-3. The Reporter’s Record lists twenty-six
exhibits; however, there is no ninth exhibit listed. Id. at 2. The total number of petitioner’s
exhibits is therefore twenty-five.
174. See 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 205-06 (discussing the fact that during
the initial investigation, DFPS found about three or four minors who were pregnant or
had children); id. at 28 (admitting Petitioner’s Exhibits 1, 2, and 3); Tex. Dep’t of Health
Servs. Record: Rebecca Keate, Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, 6 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15
(noting that she was born on August 9, 1990, and her son was born on April 27, 2007,
potentially making her fifteen when she conceived); Tex. Dep’t of Health Servs. Record:
Rachel Keate, Petitioner’s Exhibit 2, 6 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15 (noting that her
date of birth was August 27, 1990, making her eighteen years of age at the time of the
raid); Tex. Dep’t of Health Servs. Record: Sarah Johnson, Petitioner’s Exhibit 3, 6
Reporter’s Record, supra note 15 (noting that her date of birth was November 28, 1989,
meaning that she must have been impregnated before the age of eighteen).
175. See sources cited supra note 174 (illustrating that the health records contain no
information about the fathers); see also 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 206-07
(noting that the teenage girls refused to discuss the fathers of their children).
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belonged to which wife.176 What it did show was the age difference
between many of the men and their wives, and it established the
frequency of older men marrying wives fifteen to forty years their
junior.177
The Bishop’s Record was located on the YFZ Ranch and was the
“Father’s Family Information Sheet” that identified the names, ages,
and residences of all of the family members on the ranch and their
relationship to one another.178 The general pattern of some of the
Bishop’s Record reflected that the children of each wife were listed
directly below the wives’ names, but this was not always the case.179
The residence “R17” was the YFZ Ranch in general — there was no
further breakdown regarding which buildings or separate homes
within the buildings in which each family lived.180 Other residences
included: Short Creek, Arizona; Hildale, Utah; Colorado City; and
Idaho.181 The Bishop’s Record indicated that at least two wives resided
in “hiding” and several children resided “elsewhere.”182 This record
revealed that there were at least ten young women between the ages
of sixteen and seventeen who were married to older men, and an un-
known number of these women were impregnated between the ages
of fifteen and seventeen as well.183
The investigation summaries documented that there were young
mothers who had given birth as teenagers.184 Most of these young
women refused to state if they were married, their spouse’s name, or
the names of any of the persons that lived in their homes.185 The last
176. See, e.g., Bishop’s Record, supra note 90 (failing to give information about the ages
of the wives at the time of their marriages, and failing to state which children belonged
to which mothers).
177. See, e.g., id. (indicating that one fifty-four-year-old man was married to six women,
the youngest of whom was seventeen years old, and a sixty-seven-year-old man was
married to a twenty-four-year-old woman).
178. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 48, 50; see also Bishop’s Record, supra note
90 (listing the names of each husband, his wives and children, and their residences).
179. See, e.g., Bishop’s Record, supra note 90 (showing some records in which the
children of each wife were listed under her name, and some in which there was no way
to tell which children belonged to which wife).
180. See, e.g., id. (showing that every man who lived on the YFZ Ranch put “R17” for
his residence).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.; 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 201, 290-91, 294.
184. Petitioner’s Exhibits 5-16, 6 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15; Petitioner’s Exhibits
17-25, 7 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15.
185. See, e.g., CPS Investigation Summary: Rachel Keate, Petitioner’s Exhibit 5, 6
Reporter’s Record, supra note 15 (noting Rachel Keate’s marital status as unknown);
CPS Investigation Summary: Sally Jeffs, Petitioner’s Exhibit 6, 6 Reporter’s Record,
supra note 15 (noting Sally Jeffs’s marital status as unknown) [hereinafter Sally Jeffs
CPS Summary].
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exhibit of DFPS was a chart compiled by CPS investigative supervisor
Angie Voss that documented the name and date of birth of twenty-
one young mothers, their current age, their age at conception, their
child’s date of birth or age, and the source of information for these
statistics.186 These women were no longer minors according to their
dates of birth, so their information was only used to establish what
DFPS referred to as the pattern of underage girls spiritually marry-
ing older men.187 The age of the children was used to confirm the fact
that the young women were spiritually married at least nine months
before the birth of their first child.188 In reviewing the status of teen-
age girls removed from the YFZ Ranch, it appeared as if more than
half of these girls had children before the age of seventeen or were
pregnant by this age.189
The three legal elements that DFPS had to show at the fourteen-
day hearing in order to maintain temporary possession of the children
from the YFZ Ranch after they were initially removed were essentially
the same elements as under section 262.107, and section 262.201(d)
is virtually identical to subsection (b) in section 262.107.190 There
are some subtle differences worth mentioning. First, at the fourteen-
day hearing, the state has to show that the parent or person entitled
to possession of the children either did or failed to do something
which caused a danger to the children’s physical health or safety.191
In order to prove this at the fourteen-day hearing, CPS would have
needed some type of admission from a child fifteen years or younger
that her parent allowed her to spiritually marry an older man, or
failed to do anything to stop the marriage or sexual abuse.192 An ad-
mission from a fifteen-year-old that she was impregnated by a thirty-
two-year-old man, without more, is not enough to prove the first
element regarding parental neglect. Many teenagers in Texas and
186. CPS Investigator’s Chart, supra note 20; 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 243.
187. CPS Investigator’s Chart, supra note 20; see also 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note
15, at 241-42 (stating that the investigator believed that everyone on the ranch shared
the belief that no age was too young for the girls to get married).
188. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 243, 253-54 (detailing the ages at which the
underage mothers conceived their children); see also 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15,
at 174, 200 (revealing that FLDS members who engaged in extra-marital sex would be
excommunicated).
189. Michelle Roberts, Many Girls in Sect Pregnant or Had Baby, SEATTLE TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2008, at A5.
190. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(d) (Vernon Supp. 2009) with § 262.107(b)
(Vernon 2008) (using the same language to determine whether there is a continuing danger
to the child’s health or safety).
191. § 262.201(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
192. See § 2.102(a) (permitting a minor to marry with parental consent as long as the
minor is between sixteen and eighteen years of age, but not allowing marriage at any
younger age).
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around the nation have been impregnated by older men,193 and it
cannot be assumed in every instance that the parents are abusive or
neglectful. There must be some proof that the parent either neglected
to protect the daughter or actively promoted the illegal activity.194
In the FLDS cases, CPS had neither an admission from a child nor
proof of any action or inaction by a parent that showed causation of
danger to the physical health or safety of the child.195
Second, CPS had to show that there was an urgent need for pro-
tection of the children that required immediate removal.196 The risk
of harm to the child if she remained in the home would have to out-
weigh the risk of trauma the child might experience if removed from
the home.197 At the YFZ Ranch, not all of the children were at risk for
sexual abuse.198 Any pre-pubescent child or male child would not fall
into the risk category substantiated by the facts of the case.199 If a
child were to live in the same home as a sexually abused pregnant
minor or a minor with children, the state could remove that child
based on its policy that where one child is at risk for abuse and neglect
in a home, all other children in that home are also at risk and can be
removed.200 Because CPS claimed that all of the children were part of
one household, the court was able to impute risk of harm to the pre-
pubescent male and female children as well as the male teens.201
Third, CPS had to show that reasonable efforts were made to
enable the children to return home.202 Although the appellate court
and the Texas Supreme Court did not address the third element,203
193. See Carol J. De Vita, The United States at Mid-Decade, 50 POPULATION BULL.,
March 1996, at 35 box 5 (“Two-thirds of the fathers of . . . babies born to teenage
mothers . . . were age [twenty] or older.”); see also Advance Report of Final Natality
Statistics, 42 MONTHLY VITAL STAT. REP., 1991, at 26 tbl.11 (Supp. Sept. 9, 1993)
(displaying the ages of mothers and fathers in the United States in 1991).
194. See § 262.201(b)(1) (requiring evidence of danger to the child’s health or safety
due to the parent’s action or failure to act).
195. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.).
196. § 262.201(b)(2).
197. See id. (noting that, even in urgent circumstances, the state should make “reason-
able efforts, consistent with the circumstances and providing for the safety of the child,”
to avoid removal).
198. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2.
199. Id. at *3.
200. See 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 257-58 (stating that when one child in
a home has been abused, the witness believes the other children in the same home are
at risk).
201. See 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 340 (finding that for every child seized
off the ranch, the requirements of section 262.201 had been met).
202. § 262.201(b)(3).
203. See In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex.
2008) (per curiam) (denying DFPS’s petition without discussing any of the elements in
detail); In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3-*4 (discussing the failure to prove the danger
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there was little to no evidence presented at the fourteen-day hearing
to show what CPS did to try to return the children to their homes,
or to show that there was a substantial risk of continuing danger if
they were returned.204 The testimony provided stated there was a risk
of danger due to the fact that it grew dark and DFPS workers did not
feel safe enough on the ranch to continue the investigation.205 The
testimony did not answer the question of whether all of the 468 chil-
dren, no matter what age and gender, were at risk for sexual abuse.
Given the fact that only females were spiritually married at young
ages, the male children were arguably not at risk for any type of sex-
ual abuse. Even if the boys arguably were at risk of becoming sexual
predators, only a few boys were even close to reaching majority, when
they could be considered for marriage.206
The parents’ attorneys presented a number of mothers to testify
about their lifestyle on the YFZ Ranch.207 While it seemed that more
mothers and fathers were scheduled to testify at the hearing, many
backed out after others testified,208 arguably for fear of revealing facts
that would later be used for criminal prosecution of bigamy. The court
initially had a list of sixty-five mothers who were to testify, and the
actual number of mothers that served as witnesses was four.209 The
mothers who testified identified their husbands, stated that they had
married of their own free will as adult women and admitted to having
several sister-wives.210 Merilyn Jeffs admitted to having two teenage
sisters with children who were married before they conceived.211 By
providing estimates of her sisters’ ages and the ages of their children,
Merilyn Jeffs’s testimony revealed that the two sisters had to have
married before the age of eighteen.212 Further testimony revealed that
some women on the YFZ Ranch would not allow their daughters to
marry until they were at least eighteen.213 An older woman testified
that she was divorced with adult children who had chosen a different
to boys and pubescent girls, urgent need for removal, and lack of evidence that DFPS
tried to avoid removing the children, but not efforts of DFPS to return the children once
they had been removed).
204. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 323-24, 326.
205. Id. at 221-22.
206. See, e.g., In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 615
(discussing the fact that of the 126 children at issue in the suit, two of the boys were
thirteen and seventeen years old, and the ages of the others were unknown).
207. E.g., 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 3, 270-71, 294-95, 302-03.
208. See, e.g., id. at 324-26 (illustrating a time during the fourteen-day hearing when
a witness refused to testify).
209. Id. at 3, 245.
210. Id. at 251, 270, 290, 300-01, 305-06.
211. Id. at 261-64.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 254, 264-65.
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way of life.214 Her children who were married had married after the
age of eighteen, and she stated that she was willing to leave the YFZ
Ranch in order for her youngest child to be returned to her.215 None
of the women testified that they had witnessed or knew of any women
on the YFZ Ranch being married at ages fourteen, fifteen, or sixteen
years old.216
The Texas Family Code provides that “[t]he best interest of the
child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in deter-
mining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access
to the child.” 217 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that “there
is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their
children.” 218 The Texas Supreme Court in Holley v. Adams set forth
nine factors to be considered in the best interest determination, but
explicitly stated that these factors are not exhaustive.219 The Holley
factors include:
(A) the desires of the child;
(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the
future;
(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in
the future;
(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote
the best interest of the child;
(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency
seeking custody;
(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that
the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(i) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.220
The court is given wide latitude to determine the best interests of a
child.221
Texas and federal law mandate that any child who has been re-
moved from his or her parent will be appointed a guardian ad litem
(GAL), an advocate trained in the area of child protection who is
charged with presenting to the court a recommendation for the
214. Id. at 286-88 (testimony of Linda Musser).
215. Id. at 289-90.
216. Id. at 264, 279, 292, 308-09.
217. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (Vernon 2008).
218. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
219. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976).
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982).
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action that is in the best interest of the child.222 Texas law also man-
dates the appointment of an attorney ad litem (AAL) for the child so
that every child would have an opportunity through counsel to ex-
press his or her wishes.223 The children in the FLDS case were pro-
vided with Texas Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) to serve
as their GALs, and AALs to represent their expressed wishes.224 The
intent of Texas Family Code chapter 107 is to ensure that each child
involved in a suit filed by a governmental entity has the opportunity
to have his or her voice heard in court.225
At the end of the hearing, the executive director of the Children’s
Advocacy Center gave CASA’s recommendation that all of the chil-
dren remain in state care because of the suspected child sexual abuse
and the ongoing investigation.226 CASA assessed that there was “a
multi-generational history of young girls being married off and hav-
ing babies very early, [with] young boys and girls being groomed to
perpetrate this practice.” 227 CASA was unable to interview all of its
clients prior to the hearing, and was unsure of the biological mothers
and fathers of the 300-plus children that were interviewed.228 The
executive director stated that CASA was waiting for “pregnancy test-
ing and the results.” 229 She further stated that CASA “need[ed] the
opportunity to speak with the[ ] children again without them being
coached.” 230
The AALs represented for the most part that the children wanted
to return home to their parents.231 The majority of the attorneys who
substituted their judgment for the children because of their young
age were not of the opinion that the state had carried its burden of
proof with regard to the immediate danger to the physical health and
222. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii)
(2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.002(e), .011(a) (Vernon 2008).
223. See §§ 107.003(1)(b), .004(a)(2) (requiring attorneys ad litem to represent the child’s
expressed objectives).
224. See In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex.
2008) (per curiam) (describing the presence of the court-appointed representatives for
the children at the fourteen-day hearing); Terri Langford, Documents Could Play Role
in Criminal Probe of FLDS Sect, HOUSTON CHRON., July 18, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR
13480615 (“CASA is one of the many court-appointed guardians shepherding the best
interests of the . . . children taken from the sect’s ranch in April in the San Angelo court.”).
225. See, e.g., § 107.004(a)(2) (requiring the AAL to represent the child’s wishes to the
court); see also Linda Elrod et al., Proposed Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who
Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 20 FAM. L.Q. 375, 376 (1995) (noting
that the AAL must help the child articulate his or her interests).
226. 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 328.
227. Id. at 328-29.
228. Id. at 329.
229. Id. at 328.
230. Id. at 329.
231. E.g., id. at 331.
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safety to their clients.232 Several attorneys objected to the format of
the hearing because each child did not get his or her individual hear-
ing.233 Some asserted rights of their clients to communicate and visit
with their parents and for increased privacy.234 These attorneys also
requested that rules be put into place such that they would receive
notice before anyone spoke to or interviewed their clients and that
they would receive copies of documents regarding their clients.235
Throughout the case, many AALs lodged objections on various ques-
tions, most of which were overruled or not ruled upon at all by the
court.236 When the AALs were given the opportunity to ask questions,
Judge Walther requested that the chosen representatives for the var-
ious age groups of children be the spokesperson for that particular
group of attorneys in order to be more efficient.237 In fact, at one point
during the examination period, she requested that the AALs ask, “in
a controlled fashion,” just “a few questions” of the witnesses.238
During the second day of the hearing, Judge Walther asked
the AALs if they could fathom a better way in which to conduct the
fourteen-day hearing, given the massive number of parents and chil-
dren involved in the case.239 No attorney volunteered another method,
and Judge Walther proceeded with the hearing en masse.240 At the
end of the day on Friday, the judge essentially made the closing state-
ments for the all of the parties in one or two sentences, giving them
the opportunity to add more to her statements if they wished.241 It
appeared the court had reached the point where it had heard enough
to make a decision on the matter, so the rest of the hearing was largely
perfunctory. The court found that there was “sufficient evidence . . .
to satisfy a person of ordinary prudence and caution that the require-
ments of sections [sic] 262 of the [Texas] Family Code [had] been
met as to each and every element to require . . . the Court . . . [to]
continue the appointment of [DFPS] as the temporary managing
conservator of all children.” 242
232. See, e.g., id. at 338-39 (illustrating one attorney speaking for two two-and-a-half-
year-old boys and denying that the state had met its burden of proof).
233. Id. at 333-34; 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 12-13.
234. 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 333-34.
235. Id. at 334.
236. See, e.g., id. at 177-78, 196 (illustrating instances of the court failing to rule or
overruling on an objection by the AALs).
237. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 29, 188.
238. 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 110.
239. Id. at 334.
240. See id. at 334-35 (noting that no one had made any suggestions for how to run the
hearing aside from the method adopted by the court).
241. Id. at 329-31.
242. Id. at 340.
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D. Appellate and Supreme Court Review
The Third District Court of Appeals at Austin concluded that
DFPS failed to meet its burden of proof under Texas Family Code
section 262.201 and directed the district court to vacate its tempo-
rary orders granting the state custody of the 126 children covered
under the mandamus.243 There were thirty-eight mothers who filed
the appeal, and the court noted that the appeal did not involve par-
ents of all of the children removed.244 The group of parents who filed
the writ of mandamus to reverse the district court’s decision consisted
of mothers with pubescent and pre-pubescent children.245 Because
there was no direct evidence to show that the Relators’ children were
in immediate danger of physical harm, and because DFPS had painted
the entire case with such a broad stroke, the appeal was successful.246
The court of appeals reviewed the three-pronged legal standard
for removal of children in Texas and set forth that, “[u]nless there is
sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of each of the re-
quirements of section 262.201(b), the court is required to return the
children to the custody of their parents.” 247 The appellate court de-
scribed the evidence that the district court relied upon to satisfy the
requirements of section 262.201(b), mostly focusing on: the specific
number of young female teenagers who became pregnant and had chil-
dren as minors; the fact that all 468 children were part of a “house-
hold” on the YFZ Ranch where a child had been sexually abused; and
the “ ‘pervasive belief system’ among the residents of the ranch that
it is acceptable for girls to marry, engage in sex, and bear children as
soon as they reach puberty.” 248
The court further emphasized the portions of the district court
record that contained facts undisputed by DFPS.249 The facts cited
pointed to the lack of evidence presented by the State of Texas that
male children and pre-pubescent female children were victims or were
in danger of being victims of sexual or physical abuse and the lack
of evidence connecting the young female teenagers who had borne
243. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.).
244. Id. at *1 & n.1.
245. See id. at *3 (noting the children at issue in the Relators’ appeal included males,
pre-pubescent females, and pubescent females, and finding that DFPS failed to provide
“evidence of danger to the physical health or safety of any male children or any female
children who had not reached puberty,” and also failed to provide “evidence that any of
the pubescent female children of the Relators were in such physical danger”).
246. Id. at *3-*4.
247. Id. at *1.
248. Id. at *1-*2.
249. Id. at *2.
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children to sexual or physical abuse.250 The court further noted that
none of the Relators filing the appeal were mothers to the five female
children identified by DFPS as pregnant minors.251 The “pervasive
belief system” of the FLDS was the only danger to the male children
or pre-pubescent female children.252
The Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion per curiam on
May 29, 2008.253 It denied DFPS’s petition for mandamus, declining
to disturb the decision made by the Third Court of Appeals.254 The
court stated that the removal of the children was not warranted based
on its review of the lower court record.255 The court went further to
provide that, although “the district court must vacate the . . . tempo-
rary custody orders as directed by the court of appeals,” it could still
“grant[ ] other appropriate relief to protect the children” as set forth
in the Texas Family Code.256
Not all of the justices of the Texas Supreme Court agreed with
the majority’s assessment of the evidence presented by DFPS. Justice
O’Neill filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, and
Justices Johnson and Willett joined her.257 Justice O’Neill did not
agree with the court that the trial court abused its discretion in per-
mitting DFPS to keep temporary custody of the teenaged girls until
“a permanency plan [was] designed to ensure each girl’s physical
health and safety.” 258 The crux of Justice O’Neill’s opinion was that
DFPS did meet its burden of proof as to pubescent girls on the YFZ
Ranch, but not as to boys and pre-pubescent girls.259 Justice O’Neill
recounted the facts which supported the trial court’s findings, in-
cluding the Bishop’s Records which reflected five underage wives who
were pregnant and/or had given birth to a child as a minor, and the
testimony of child psychologist Dr. Bruce Perry.260 Dr. Perry had
testified that “the pregnancy of the underage children on the Ranch
was the result of sexual abuse because children [aged sixteen and
younger] are not sufficiently mature to enter a healthy consensual
sexual relationship or a ‘marriage.’ ” 261 Justice O’Neill determined
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2008) (per
curiam).
254. Id. at 615.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 616 (O’Neill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 618.
260. Id. at 616.
261. Id.
2010] THE TEXAS MIS-STEP 481
that the State of Texas had met the low burden of proof, “sufficient
evidence to satisfy a person of ordinary prudence and caution,” 262 as
it pertained to the pubescent girls on the YFZ Ranch.263
There were several amicus briefs filed with the Texas Supreme
Court in the FLDS case. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
filed a brief in opposition to the State of Texas,264 and Barbara Elias-
Perciful, director of Texas Lawyers for Children and chair of the Texas
State Bar Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect, filed a brief in her
individual capacity supporting DFPS.265 The ACLU argued that the
evidence presented by DFPS was insufficient to justify removal of the
children, and amounted to a parent-child separation based on the
parents’ beliefs and associations.266 The third prong of the ACLU brief
specifically argued that the state may not separate parents and their
children based solely on thoughts and beliefs.267
II. THE SHORT CREEK RAID OF 1953
A. History and Facts of Case
Short Creek was a remote pioneer town on the Utah-Arizona
border established in the 1930s by a small minority of Latter-Day
Saints who did not want to accept The Manifesto, the Mormon Church’s
declaration that polygamous marriage, among other practices that
offended mainstream America, would no longer be permitted in the
religion.268 It was considered a safe haven for men and their families
who were excommunicated by the Mormon Church over polygamy.269
In 1935, the Utah legislature amended section 103-51-2 of the Revised
Statutes of Utah to make polygamy, or unlawful cohabitation, a fel-
ony.270 Fundamentalists, a name accepted by those who believed in
262. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
263. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 616-18 (O’Neill, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
264. Brief of Amici Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union et al., In Opposition to
Relator’s Petition for Mandamus, In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255
S.W.3d 613 (No. 08-0391) [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
265. Brief for Barbara J. Elias-Perciful, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, In
re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613 (No. 08-0391) [hereinafter
Elias-Perciful Brief].
266. ACLU Brief, supra note 264, at 2, 10-12.
267. Id. at 12-13.
268. Ken Driggs, “This Will Someday Be the Head and Not the Tail of the Church”: A
History of the Mormon Fundamentalists at Short Creek, 43 J. CHURCH & ST. 49, 49-51
(2001).
269. Id. at 58-59.
270. Act of Mar. 21, 1935, ch. 112, 1935 Utah Laws 220.
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plural marriage and United Order,271 were turned over to the authori-
ties by the LDS after they were excommunicated.272 In Arizona, when
eight individuals were charged with polygamy, news reports specu-
lated that the action was triggered by government welfare investiga-
tions and LDS Church pressure.273 Only two men were brought to
trial, and both claimed First Amendment protection as a defense.274
They were sentenced to eighteen months in the Arizona Penitentiary
and after release returned to Short Creek.275
In 1944, “[a] multi-state raid by federal and state authorities
rounded up forty-six Fundamentalist men and women on a variety of
charges, including virtually the entire leadership.” 276 The State of
Utah charged the Fundamentalists with unlawful cohabitation and
criminal conspiracy.277 “The federal government charged some mem-
bers . . . with mailing obscene literature,” kidnapping, and violating
the Mann Act.278 Some of the charges were dropped a year later, but
a total of four cases reached the United States Supreme Court.279
The first case before the federal court280 charged the Fundamen-
talists with mailing obscene literature for distributing Truth maga-
zine, a publication dedicated to the perpetuation of plural marriage.281
The district court held that there was nothing obscene or lewd about
the editorials in Truth and dismissed the indictment.282 Later, the
United States Supreme Court dismissed the case pursuant to Rule
35.283 In Chatwin v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the defendants’ conviction under the Federal Kidnapping
Act,284 holding that there was no ransom sought by the defendants
271. RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY iii-iv (1986). The United
Order was the Mormon principle of stewardship whereby members of the group “were
directed to deed all personal property to the bishop of the church” to unify the group. Id.
at 2-3. It was intended to be “a pattern of social and economic reorganization for all
mankind.” Id.
272. Driggs, supra note 268, at 62.
273. Id. at 61-62.
274. Id. at 61.
275. Id. at 61-62.
276. Id. at 65.
277. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 72.
278. Id. at 72-73.
279. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14
(1946); Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946); United States v. Barlow (Barlow
II), 323 U.S. 805 (1944); see Driggs, supra note 268, at 66 (recognizing that only four
cases reached the U.S. Supreme Court).
280. United States v. Barlow (Barlow I), 56 F. Supp. 795 (D. Utah 1944).
281. Id. at 795-96; see also BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 37, 72-73 (discussing the found-
ing of Truth magazine and the prosecution of the Fundamentalists for mailing obscene
literature).
282. Barlow I, 56 F. Supp. at 797-98.
283. Barlow II, 323 U.S. 805.
284. 18 U.S.C. §§ 408a, 408c (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006)).
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and there was no evidence that the alleged victim, a fifteen-year-old
girl, was held against her will.285 In Cleveland v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Fundamentalists’ convic-
tions under the Mann Act286 for transporting women or girls in inter-
state commerce for immoral purposes.287 The Court held the fact that
polygamy was supported by the Fundamentalists’ religious creed was
“no defense in a prosecution for bigamy.” 288 The Court stated that
it was not “the accused’s concepts of morality,” but rather the stan-
dard articulated by Congress within the meaning of the statute that
applied.289 Finally, in Musser v. Utah, the defendants argued that
their conviction for conspiracy to “commit acts injurious to public
morals” under Utah Code Ann. Section 103-11-1 (1943) violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.290 The United States Supreme Court vacated
the conviction and remanded the case for the Supreme Court of Utah
to interpret its own statute.291
Eventually, “thirty-one men were sentenced to local jail terms
of up to one year;” fifteen men were sentenced to Utah State Prison
terms of up to five years, and a few more were subjected to federal
sentences.292 Nine of the fifteen in state prison were paroled after
serving six and a half months when they pledged to “refrain . . . from
advocating, teaching, or countenancing the practice of plural mar-
riage.” 293 Despite their pledges, the Fundamentalists returned home
and resumed the Fundamentalist lifestyle.294
The Short Creek raid began in 1951 when a local judge instigated
a secret investigation of Short Creek.295 The State of Arizona, through
Governor Howard Pyle and the Arizona legislature, allocated $50,000
from the governor’s emergency fund to finance the raid.296 A Los
Angeles detective agency went into the community under the pre-
tense that they were Hollywood agents looking for a movie location.297
The agency was hired by Arizona Governor Howard Pyle.298 As the
investigation continued, the detectives obtained “a map of the town
285. Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460 (1946).
286. 18 U.S.C. §§ 397, 398, 401, 404 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424
(2006)).
287. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 95-96 (1948).
291. Id. at 98.
292. Driggs, supra note 268, at 66.
293. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 89.
294. Id. at 90.
295. Driggs, supra note 268, at 68.
296. Id. at 68-69.
297. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 119.
298. Id.
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identifying the occupants of each home” 299 in order to execute “the
great Love-nest raid.” 300
On July 25, 1953, while the people at Short Creek were preparing
for festivities in celebration of Mormon Pioneer Day, government
forces met in a high school auditorium 125 miles south of Short Creek
to discuss the impending raid.301 Roadblocks would be set up and two
separate groups of forces would arrive at the same time, one from
the east and the other from the west.302 “Each patrolman received
a map with a red circle around the house of the family for which he
would be responsible.” 303
A caravan of cars set out for Short Creek in late afternoon and
arrived around 4:00 A.M. with lights flashing and sirens wailing.304
The caravan, consisting of “heavily armed law enforcement officers . . .
national guardsmen, the Arizona Attorney General, superior and juve-
nile court judges, policewomen, nurses, doctors, twenty-five carloads
of newspapermen, and twelve liquor control agents,” expected the
community to be asleep.305 Instead, they found men, women, and chil-
dren, “dressed and well groomed,” standing around the schoolhouse
singing “America.” 306
Carolyn Jessop recalls her grandmother repeatedly telling her
the story about the raid at Short Creek on July 26, 1953, stating
“[t]he raid is a key focal point of FLDS history.” 307
Grandma said rumors were rampant that a raid was com-
ing. . . .
A lookout was posted on the only road coming into town. The
young man was supposed to warn the community if he saw the
authorities coming by exploding several sticks of dynamite. The
blast came . . . . [and] the lookout ran into town and fell at the feet
of Uncle Roy, shouting, “They are coming; they’re coming, and
there are hundreds of them!” 308
299. Driggs, supra note 268, at 68.
300. Arizona: The Great Love-Nest Raid, TIME, Aug., 3, 1953, available at http://www
.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,822887,00.html.
301. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 127-28.
302. Id. at 128.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 129-30.
305. ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 10, at 49; see also B. CARMON HARDY, SOLEMN
COVENANT: THE MORMON POLYGAMOUS PASSAGE 344 (1992) (listing the actors involved
in the raid on Short Creek).
306. ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 10, at 49; see also HARDY, supra note 305, at 344
(describing the inhabitants’ peaceful early morning assembly).
307. CAROLYN JESSOP WITH LAURA PALMER, ESCAPE 20 (2007).
308. Id. at 20. The man referred to as “Uncle Roy” was Short Creek leader Leroy
Johnson. Driggs, supra note 268, at 69.
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The Arizona National Guard, police, and other local officials “moved
into Short Creek and began arresting men and women who practiced
polygamy.” 309 Grandpa Joseph Jessop, the patriarch of the commu-
nity at the time, stepped forward and asked, “ ‘What is it that you
want? What have you come for? If it is blood you want, take mine, I’m
ready.’ ” 310 Laura Palmer, Carolyn Jessop’s grandmother, recalled
that troops attempted to take wailing children away from their scream-
ing mothers.311 Photos taken of these “terrible images” appeared the
next day in newspapers and “turned public opinion in favor of the
polygamists.” 312 One hundred and twenty-two women and men were
arrested and 263 children were identified for seizure by the time the
raid was finished.313 The state’s plan was to remove the children,
“make them wards of the state[,] and adopt them out to nonpolyga-
mist families.” 314
Within a week of the raid the mothers and children were bused to
Phoenix where they were housed in a crowded rest home.315 Governor
Pyle defended the raid, calling it a “ ‘momentous police action against
insurrection within [Arizona’s] own borders.’ ” 316 He asserted that
Short Creek was “a community entirely dedicated to the warped philos-
ophy that a small handful of greedy and licentious men should have
the right and the power to control the destiny of every human soul
in the community.” 317 He further stated that the women and the men
were “unalterably dedicated to the wicked theory that every maturing
girl child should be forced into the bondage of multiple wifehood with
men of all ages for the sole purpose of producing more children to be
reared to become more chattels of this totally lawless enterprise.” 318
B. Due Process Hearings and Subsequent Cases
The hearings and trials regarding the criminal and child welfare
cases in Arizona went on for two years.319 The Fundamentalists were
309. JESSOP WITH PALMER, supra note 307, at 20-21.
310. Id. at 21.
311. Id.
312. Id.; see also Gary Tuchman & Amanda Townsend, A Dark History Repeats
for Religious Sect, CNN.COM, Apr. 11, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/10/
polygamist.towns.index.html (“It was a public relations nightmare from the start. Crying
children . . . were yanked from their parents in the dark of a July night.”).
313. JESSOP WITH PALMER, supra note 307, at 21.
314. Id.
315. Billie Stanton, Most County Residents Know Little About the Area that Lies North
of the Grand Canyon, KINGMAN DAILY MIRROR, Aug. 2, 1981, at 19.
316. JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN: A STORY OF VIOLENT FAITH 16
(2003).
317. Id. at 17.
318. Id.
319. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 154, 156.
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charged with “rape, statutory rape, carnal knowledge, polygamous
living, cohabitation, bigamy, adultery, and misappropriation of school
funds.” 320 Certain members were accused of having “encouraged,
advised, counseled and induced their minor, female children under
eighteen years of age to actively participate in [the] unlawful con-
duct.” 321 Arizona Superior Court Judge Robert Tuller gave one-year
suspended sentences to twenty-six men as part of a plea bargain that
dropped charges against all of the women and a few other men.322
Instead of imprisoning the parents, authorities focused on taking
away the Fundamentalists’ children.323
The removal of many children from Short Creek during the raid
of 1953 meant that the State of Arizona declared these children to be
dependent and neglected.324 The physical state of the homes in Short
Creek was reported to be dirty, ramshackle, without window or door
screens, and without plumbing, where families faced crowded sleep-
ing conditions and inadequate food.325 The Superior Court of Mohave
County ordered the children be placed in the custody of the Arizona
State Department of Public Welfare.326 In October 1953, the Mohave
County Superior Court ruled that the mothers could retain custody
of their children under four conditions: (1) the court disallowed the
mothers from returning to Short Creek; (2) the mothers had to “refrain
from teaching their children to violate the laws of Arizona”; (3) the
mothers could not associate with the children’s fathers; and (4) Ari-
zona’s Department of Public Welfare would supervise the mothers and
children.327 The main issue at each hearing was whether the children
were “neglected, dependent, or delinquent.” 328 The court eventually
held that there was insufficient evidence to justify removing the chil-
dren from their parents’ custody.329 The court returned the children
to their parents, finding that the parents “were denied the active par-
ticipation of their attorneys in the juvenile hearings.” 330 The Supreme
Court of Arizona affirmed.331
320. Id. at 131.
321. Id.
322. Driggs, supra note 268, at 69-70.
323. Id. at 70.
324. Ariz. State Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Barlow, 296 P.2d 298, 299 (Ariz. 1956).
325. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 133.
326. Barlow, 296 P.2d at 299.
327. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 154-55.
328. Id. at 156.
329. Id. at 157. “Social service workers, matrons, and other interested officers were
present at the [Edson and Alyne] Jessop [and other family] hearings[,] but all declined to
comment.” Id. at 156-57.
330. See Barlow, 296 P.2d at 299 (referring to the decision of the Superior Court of
Maricopa County).
331. Id. at 301.
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C. Supreme Court Review
There were two trial court cases that proceeded to state supreme
courts from the 1953 raid, one in Utah and one in Arizona.332 Daniel
and Elnora Barlow sought to secure custody of their seventeen chil-
dren from the Arizona State Department of Public Welfare.333 The
superior court declared that the detention of the children by the state
was illegal and ordered the children’s release to their parents.334
Arizona appealed this decision to the supreme court, which affirmed
the decision that the parents were denied active participation of their
attorneys, thus making the hearing void because of denial of due
process of law.335 The supreme court also affirmed the finding that
there was no proof that the parents’ custody was not in the best
interest of the children.336
In re Black337 was the most well known court case that came
out of the Short Creek raid. This case involved Leonard Black, his
three wives, and twenty-six children.338 His legal wife, Verna, and
her eleven children lived a block away from Mr. Black’s third wife,
Lorna Johnson, and her seven children in Short Creek, Arizona.339
Mr. Black’s second wife, Vera Johnson, and her eight children lived
about a mile away in Utah.340 Because she resided in Utah, Vera
Johnson was not arrested in the Short Creek raid.341 Vera’s situa-
tion, however, “provided a test case for Utah officials who proposed
to separate children from parents who would not sign an affidavit
promising neither to teach nor practice polygamy.” 342 When her chil-
dren were removed in 1954, Vera demanded to ride with them until
she was evicted from the automobile by a judge’s order.343 The order
of separation was subsequently overturned by an appellate judge,
and the children were returned to their mother.344
In 1956, Utah again attempted to separate Vera from her chil-
dren and persuade her to renounce polygamy in order to retain cus-
tody of them.345 Vera refused, and the children were ordered into
332. Barlow, 296 P.2d 298; In re Black, 283 P.2d 887 (Utah 1955).
333. Barlow, 296 P.2d at 299.
334. Id. at 301.
335. Id. at 299, 301.
336. Id. at 301.
337. 283 P.2d 887 (Utah 1955).
338. Id. at 888.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. LEVI S. PETERSON, JUANITA BROOKS: MORMON WOMAN HISTORIAN 246 (1988).
342. Id. at 246-47.
343. Id. at 247.
344. Id.
345. Id.
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foster care and instructed “to have no communication with former
loved ones or friends.” 346 The legal issue was whether the parents
of eight minor children between the ages of two and seventeen were
negligent based solely on their religious beliefs.347
Six of Leonard Black’s daughters were married, five of whom
were either plural wives or married to men who later acquired mul-
tiple wives.348 All of Mr. Black’s married daughters were under eigh-
teen years old when they married, and one was only fifteen.349 Mr.
Black “took no action when he knew that five of his daughters were
entering into [a polygamous] relationship.” 350 Vera (Johnson) Black
testified that “if her children were taken away . . . she would be un-
willing to promise that she and Mr. Black would refrain from polyga-
mous cohabitation in order to get her children back.” 351 Both parents
confessed that they did not tell their children that polygamous mar-
riage was illegal.352
The Utah District Court found that Leonard and Vera Johnson
Black, “by their . . . own conduct and example in living in polygamy
and by associating themselves with a religious group whose members
practice and advocate polygamy [had] encouraged their children to
become polygamists when they became of marriageable age.” 353
Though the court found that “there was no evidence that any of the
children were destitute and without proper sustenance, clothing or
medical care,” the home of Leonard and Vera Johnson Black was none-
theless an “immoral environment for the rearing of said children.” 354
The district court held as a matter of law that the children were
neglected within the meaning of section 55-10-6 of the Utah Code
and ordered the children into foster care.355
The Supreme Court of Utah held that it was proper to deprive
parents of the control and custody of their children because the chil-
dren had been neglected under Utah law due to the parents’ polyga-
mous relationship and teachings.356 “One year after the raid, the
Arizona Welfare Department conducted an updated study of the
346. Id.
347. See BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 177 (“No testimony offered in any of the court
cases either asserted or established that Vera [Johnson] was an unfit mother in any way
except for her religious beliefs.”).
348. In re Black, 283 P.2d 887, 896 (Utah 1955).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 911.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 891.
354. Id. (emphasis in original).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 899-900.
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circumstances of [the] various fundamentalist women and their
children. . . . All of the women returned to Short Creek when they
had the chance.” 357 Apparently, the practice of polygamy was not
jeopardized by accusations, arrests, or litigation.358
III. WHY THE TEXAS CHILD REMOVAL FAILED
The overall reason that the largest child removal in modern
U.S. history failed was because the State of Texas overreached its
authority trying to protect children who did not fit within the emer-
gency child removal legal standard. At the core of the FLDS case was
the ultimate question posed by many in the media: was this case more
about the disapproval of a particular religion or the alleged abuse
of children?359 It may have been bias that caused CPS to focus more
on the “pervasive belief system” than how the actual facts of the case
supported the danger posed to the some of the children on the YFZ
Ranch. Considering the fact that Warren Jeffs, the leading prophet
of the FLDS, has been convicted for being an accomplice to child
rape (between a fourteen-year-old child bride and her nineteen-year-
old first cousin) and has been charged with sexual assault, bigamy
charges, and “charges related to the underage marriage of two FLDS
girls,” 360 it is understandable that Texas authorities feared that
children on the YFZ Ranch were at risk for abuse or neglect.
Perhaps at the heart of the matter is the state’s willingness and
ability to prosecute members of the FLDS for bigamy or child bigamy.
Although state and federal laws provide law enforcement the neces-
sary tools to target anyone who engages in the practice of polygamy,361
officials arguably did not opt to fully enforce the law during the Texas
357. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 146.
358. Id. at 147.
359. See, e.g., Child Welfare in Texas, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 2, 2008, at 6B (question-
ing the motive of CPS in taking the children, and positing that it had more to do with
religious differences than with concern for the children’s welfare); Gregory A. Hession,
Whose Children Are They, Anyway?, NEW AM., June 23, 2008, at 21 (suggesting that
“hysteria over religious or political beliefs” was behind the mass seizure and subsequent
court case); Ken Rodriguez, CPS Remains Blind to its Blunders in Polygamist-Ranch
Case, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 4, 2008, at 01B (implying that CPS took all of
the children because it saw only “a community of religious polygamists”).
360. Associated Press, Estate of Rulon Jeffs Seeks Control of Trust, DESERET NEWS,
Nov. 28, 2009, at B04.
361. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.01 (Vernon Supp. 2009) (providing that bigamy
is a prosecutable offense); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341, 344, 348 (1890) (affirming
that United States courts had jurisdiction to hear charges related to religiously-motivated
polygamy, despite the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution),
abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 166-67 (1878) (holding that religious duty is not a constitutionally protected defense
to the criminal indictment of polygamy).
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raid. Various reasons have been noted regarding the failure of law
enforcement to confront polygamists, including “difficulty in actually
proving polygamist behavior,” 362 an aversion to making enforcement
a priority,363 “insufficient resources and funding” to prosecute polyg-
amists,364 “general misconception[s among law enforcement officials]
concerning the scope of First Amendment protection for religious
practices,” 365 and concerns about the government’s ability to handle
the “massive influx of children” in state care if the government
arrested all polygamist parents.366 Though child abuse and sexual
assault of children appear to be easier to prosecute than polygamy,
many of the same enforcement issues arise when dealing with the
FLDS, such as the difficulty in proving the crime without willing
witnesses, and the “lack of formal records.” 367
The State of Texas eventually did bring bigamy charges against
several men on the YFZ ranch, including Raymond Merrill Jessop
and eleven others who were indicted in the fall of 2008 on various
criminal charges.368 Interestingly, the State of Texas seems to be try-
ing the sexual assault cases separately from the bigamy cases.369
Raymond Jessop was the first polygamist sect member to stand
trial,370 and he was convicted of sexually assaulting his sixteen-year-
old spiritual wife in November of 2004 at the YFZ Ranch.371 He was
sentenced to ten years in prison and an $8000 fine.372 Jessop, who
allegedly has nine wives, will be tried later on the separate bigamy
charge.373 The evidence that weighed heavily in the sexual assault
case was the DNA results from the paternity testing of Jessop, the
victim, and the child, as well as church documents seized from the
April 2008 raid on the ranch.374
362. Jason D. Berkowitz, Note, Beneath the Veil Of Mormonism: Uncovering The Truth
About Polygamy in the United States and Canada, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 615,
629 (2006-2007).
363. Id. at 630.
364. Id. at 631.
365. Id. at 632.
366. Id.
367. See Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 16
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 141 (2006) (discussing the difficulties inherent in the
prosecution of crimes related to polygamy).
368. Trish Choate, FLDS Trial: Jessop Guilty of Sexual Assault, GO SAN ANGELO
STANDARD-TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.gosanangelo.com/news/2009/nov/05/jury-in
-jessop-trial-will-hear-closing-arguments/. Jessop was convicted of sexual assault of a
child, a second-degree felony. Id.
369. Roberts, supra note 52.
370. Id.
371. Id.; Choate, supra note 368.
372. Texas Polygamist Sect Member, supra note 52, at 61.
373. Roberts, supra note 52.
374. Trish Choate, Talk of ‘Celestial Wives,’ Long-Term Effects of Assault, GO SAN
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It could be argued that the state did not have enough time to
obtain admissible evidence to show that all of the children were at
risk for abuse or neglect before the due process hearing. Many times
in child welfare cases there are parties to the suit who know relevant
facts to the legal question at issue but are unable to prove the facts
in court because of an uncooperative or unavailable witness.375 Other
times the children are the keepers of useful information, but because
of the protective nature of most courts, family code provisions to pre-
vent additional trauma to the child, and exceptions to the hearsay
rule, they are not called to testify.376 The children’s attorneys in the
YFZ case complained that they were unable to access records and
documents necessary to better represent their clients during the due
process hearing.377 The sheer volume of the case posed a logistics
nightmare for the district court personnel in the small town of San
Angelo.378 Much of what might have been available in a larger venue
was not available in this case. Although time and resources may have
been factors in the outcome, there are four other distinct reasons the
case failed.
A. History Repeats Itself
The Short Creek raid of 1953 in Arizona was the largest removal
of children due to allegations of abuse and neglect prior to the Texas
FLDS raid.379 Because it involved the same religious sect and the
removal of the children centered on similar allegations of underage
plural marriages,380 the Short Creek raid of 1953 was an appropriate
precedent case for the Texas FLDS raid. The similarities of the two
raids are striking — both were alleged to stem from government con-
spiracies, both involved legal, civil and criminal lawsuits, both stimu-
lated media backlash because of the child removals, both engendered
sympathy from Americans for the women and children, both were
costly for the state child protective service agencies, and both raids
ANGELO STANDARD-TIMES, Nov. 9, 2009, http://www.gosanangelo.com/news/2009/nov/09/
courtroom-mood-solemn-as-flds-sentencing-hearing/.
375. See, e.g., 2 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 6 (1974) (discussing the difficulty in finding
evidence, including witnesses, to prove battered child syndrome).
376. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 104.002-.006 (Vernon 2008) (describing Texas rules
of evidence pertaining to statements by children in child abuse cases).
377. Ismael Estrada et al., Witness: Teens at Ranch Said Any Age OK to Marry,
CNN.COM, Apr. 18, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/17/polygamy.custody/.
378. See id. (describing the process in the courtroom as “chaotic” and “laborious,” and
noting such difficulties as limited courtroom space and the need for parties to utilize
“multiple locations around town, linked by closed-circuit television to the courthouse”).
379. Wendy Koch, Second Arrest Made at Texas Polygamist Ranch, USA Today, Apr. 7,
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-04-07-polygamist-compound_N.htm.
380. Id.
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resulted in the return of every child to their parents.381 Perhaps Texas
did not have the time prior to determining its legal strategy to invest
in researching the case law generated by the Short Creek raid, but
had it done so it might have altered how the Texas case unfolded.
Specifically, Texas would have been aided by knowing what legal
claims the State of Arizona made against the parents in the FLDS
and why those claims were unsuccessful. This would have enabled
Texas to determine how to best frame the actions or inactions of the
parents regarding the treatment of the children who were the alleged
victims of sexual abuse.
The charges lodged against the FLDS during the 1953 raid
“included rape, statutory rape, carnal knowledge, polygamous liv-
ing, cohabitation, bigamy, adultery, and misappropriation of school
funds.” 382 In both Texas and Arizona, the government emphasized
the belief system of the parents and how the parents brought up their
children to maintain the lifestyle to which they had been exposed.383
The opinion of the court in Arizona was that “the morals of [the]
children [were] endangered, and they [were] in danger of becoming
law violators if they [were] permitted to remain in [the] community
and in the custody and control of their . . . parents.” 384 Though In re
Black did hold that raising children in a polygamous environment
was morally wrong and illegal,385 later in history the Utah court de-
clined to apply this rule in a subsequent child custody case involving
a dissolved polygamous family and another adoption case.386
381. See Geoffrey Fattah, Parallels to Short Creek Raid in 1953 are Pointed Out,
DESERET NEWS, Apr. 10, 2008, at A04 (noting that “what is unfolding in Texas is history
almost repeating itself,” according to Professor Martha Sonntag Bradley, University of
Utah, author of KIDNAPPED FROM THAT LAND: THE GOVERNMENT RAIDS ON THE SHORT
CREEK POLYGAMISTS, supra note 10); compare supra text accompanying notes 295-331
with supra text accompanying notes 2-31, 242-267 (discussing the facts of the Short
Creek raid of 1953 and the FLDS raid in 2008).
382. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 131.
383. See In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.) (noting the Department’s reliance on the “ ‘pervasive belief system’ of the
FLDS, [that] the male children are groomed to be perpetrators of sexual abuse and the
girls are raised to be victims of sexual abuse” to justify removal of the children from their
FLDS parents); In re Black, 283 P.2d 887, 911, 913 (Utah 1955) (finding that the parents
were guilty of neglect because they were raising their children to believe in a polygamous
lifestyle).
384. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 156.
385. In re Black, 283 P.2d at 913.
386. See Johanson v. Fischer (In re Adoption of W.A.T.), 808 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Utah 1991)
(holding that the petitioners’ religious belief in plural marriage was one factor the trial
court must consider to determine whether specific placement “would promote the interest
of child[ren] to be adopted” and that the “[p]rospective . . . parents’ illegal or unconstitu-
tional conduct . . . [was] not properly considered as a threshold determination in adoption
petition”); Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1987) (holding that the practice
of “polygamy is alone insufficient to support a custody award or to permit meaningful
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The legality of the raid was questioned by members of the Arizona
House of Representatives because of the use of government funding,
and many in the public posed constitutional questions centered on
privacy and freedom of religion.387 These criticisms were very similar
to those meted out by the public after the Texas Supreme Court rul-
ing in the YFZ Ranch case.388 Unlike in Texas, however, the children’s
cases in Arizona were heard individually.389 Another striking simi-
larity was that a small percentage of the girls between the ages of
fourteen and seventeen years on both the Arizona and Texas com-
pounds were either pregnant or were the mothers of young children.390
In Arizona, the juvenile court focused on approximately fifty girls be-
tween eleven and eighteen years of age because “they were potential
plural wives and mothers.” 391 Arizona’s Attorney General had “com-
piled profiles of each family unit” before the Short Creek raid “based
on census records, birth certificates, and school census records.” 392
This information was not readily available to Texas before the raid
at YFZ Ranch, and CPS compiled profiles of family units after the
children were removed from their parents and DNA samples were
collected.393
review on appeal”). Both decisions substantially limit In re Black without expressly
overturning it.
387. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 150-51.
388. See Hession, supra note 359 (stating that the court was infringing on the parents’
privacy with some of its demands, and arguing that despite the media hype about alleged
sexual abuse, freedom of religion remains one of the central tenets of the U.S.
Constitution); Corrie MacLaggan, Year After Raid, Bills Consider Removal Policy,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2009, at A01 (discussing the desire of some legislators,
who were “disturbed” by the manner in which the YFZ raid was conducted, to rewrite
the child removal laws).
389. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 177; see also supra note 162 and accompanying text
(discussing the single mass hearing for the Texas FLDS children).
390. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 100; ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 7.
391. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 100.
392. Id. at 99-100.
393. See Order Vacating Temporary Managing Conservatorship and Additional
Temporary Orders at 3-5, In re Minor Children From the YFZ Ranch, Nos. 2779-2902,
2905-2908 (51st Dist. Ct., Schleicher County, Tex. June 2, 2008) (ordering the parents
to submit to having photographs and fingerprints taken and providing information about
the make-up of each household); Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., Statement on
Reunification Plan (June 2, 2008), http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/About/News/2008/eldorado/
2008-06-02_plan.asp (describing the order to return the children and the accompanying
conditions). There was some controversy as to whether CPS really did not know which
child belonged to which parent, because the children were ordered to be returned to their
parents prior to the DNA results coming back, and there was little confusion when it came
time to return the children. See Janet Elliott, Sect Family Hesitant to Return to Ranch,
HOUSTON CHRON., June 4, 2008, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive
.mpl?id=2008_4578762 (noting that most of the DNA results had not yet come in, but two
days after the order to return the children to their families, almost 400 children had left
state custody).
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Similar to the case in Texas, many Americans were opposed to
the removal at Short Creek because of media coverage that described
tearful children being physically pulled away from their anguished
mothers.394 One difference in the two cases is that the Arizona author-
ities were primarily concerned with cracking down on polygamy as
opposed to child abuse and neglect. It was clear from the onset of the
Short Creek raid that the purpose was to free women and young girls
in the FLDS from what Arizona Governor John Howard Pyle referred
to as white slavery.395 One of the chief instigators of the Short Creek
raid, Judge Jesse Faulkner, stated that there were only two ways to
stop polygamy.396 First, the state could “prosecute and convict and
sentence every man and woman guilty.” 397 Second, the authorities
could “take the children of these bogus marriages and turn them
over to a proper department for placement in juvenile homes or for
adoption.” 398 Interestingly, Texas has in short order switched gears
to address Judge Faulkner’s first stopgap for polygamy since the
YFZ child protection case ended.399
It would have been useful for Texas to have known the pitfalls
of the Short Creek raid of 1953. Even though the State of Arizona
was able to identify the parents and children at Short Creek so that
individualized hearings could be held,400 the arguments of both state
governments were ultimately flawed. If the attorney general or the
local district attorneys had the benefit of the legal history of the cases,
it could have made a difference in the testimony and evidence pre-
sented to the court. If nothing else, DFPS would have relied less
heavily on the pervasive belief system on the YFZ ranch and more
on proving the actual risks to the physical health and safety of the
children at risk.
B. Flawed Arguments
1. One Household
DFPS removed 468 children from the YFZ Ranch, not because
it was able to show that each child’s physical health and safety was
394. See JESSOP WITH PALMER, supra note 307, at 21 (recalling the image of crying
children being pulled from their mother’s arms at Short Creek).
395. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 97, 113 (“One of the government’s motives in the 1953
raid was to ‘free’ these women from a form of sexual slavery and to ‘protect’ the young
women of Short Creek from an untenable situation of limited choice . . . .”).
396. Id. at 120-21.
397. Id. at 121.
398. Id.
399. See Choate, supra note 368 (indicating that after the 2008 raid, eleven men were
indicted on various criminal charges related to polygamy).
400. BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 177 (noting that the policy of juvenile courts in Utah
in the 1950s was to hear children’s cases individually).
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in danger, but because it asserted that all the children were part of
one household.401 At the time of this removal, Texas law provided that
when one child is found to be at risk for neglect or abuse in a house-
hold, the court may take that into consideration when determining
whether other children in the same household are at risk for neglect
or abuse.402 The CPS supervisor, Angie Voss, testified that when she
has “made an assessment that there[ ] [is] a child that has either been
abused in the home or is at risk of abuse,” her belief is that all of the
other children in that home are unsafe.403 Ms. Voss also stated that
she was very concerned about the “overall mindset” and the “perva-
sive belief ” 404 that “when the prophet decided for them to be mar-
ried, which could be . . . at any age, no age too young, they would be
married and . . . have as many babies as they could.” 405 Her explana-
tion of why her concerns involved all members of the household was
that during her contact with the children and the adults on the YFZ
Ranch, they explained to her that they are “one big family, one large
community, and that they all share the same belief system.” 406 Ms.
Voss testified that she observed this pattern at the YFZ Ranch, was
able to identify several victims, and was concerned that all the chil-
dren at the YFZ Ranch were potential victims.407 There was also evi-
dence from the Bishop’s Record that all of the various families at the
YFZ Ranch were housed in a location known as “Residence R17.” 408
The term “household” is not defined in chapter 261 in the Texas
Family Code, the chapter that pertains to investigations, but it is
defined in chapter 263, which deals with review of children that
have been placed under the care of DFPS.409 According to the statute,
“ ‘[h]ousehold’ means a unit composed of persons living together in
the same dwelling, without regard to whether they are related to each
other.” 410 This is particularly useful because chapter 263 deals with
the review of placements of children in foster homes where unrelated
persons would live together in the same home.411 Within the context
401. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.).
402. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 262.107(b), .201(d) (Vernon 2008 & Supp. 2009)
(allowing a court to consider whether a guardian has abused another child when
determining whether a child should be removed).
403. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 257.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 205.
406. Id. at 258.
407. Id.
408. Bishop’s Record, supra note 90.
409. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.001(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
410. Id.
411. See id. §§ 263.001(a)(2), (a)(4), .002 (Vernon 2008) (defining substitute care, which
includes foster care, as the placement of a child in the home of someone who is not the
child’s parent, and the court’s ability to review the child’s placement there).
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of the FLDS case, there were many children and persons living in
R17 who were not related to one another.412 Ms. Voss testified about
the families who lived together, stating that “all of the women are
called mothers to all of the children that call one another brothers
and sisters.” 413 She further stated that there are “mothers with their
biological children who are married to a man who is married to sev-
eral other women,” with whom he has other biological children.414
Chapter 261 does offer a definition for a person who is considered
responsible for a child’s care, custody or welfare.415 This person is one
“who traditionally is responsible for a child’s care, custody, or welfare,
including . . . a member of the child’s family or household as defined
by Chapter 71 [or] a person with whom the child’s parent cohabits.” 416
Chapter 71 deals with protective orders and family violence, and the
definition of “household” is identical to the definition in chapter 263.417
According to the Texas Family Code, each mother who lived in a
household on the YFZ Ranch could be considered responsible for the
care, custody, or welfare of every child in the household.418 It stands
to reason that perhaps DFPS may have been able to group many of
the family members that resided in one dwelling together for the
sake of removal as a “household.”
The assertion that all 468 of the children came from the same
household was a stretch, though, and DFPS offered contradictory testi-
mony to that point. Ms. Voss testified that during the investigation,
she and other investigators had to go “house to house” to locate other
children that were not brought forth initially by the FLDS leader
Merrill Jessop.419 When asked what she meant when she said “house
to house,” Ms. Voss stated that many of the houses on the ranch are
“three story structures, [with] lots and lots of rooms.” 420 She testified
that she went to approximately six or seven homes during her in-
vestigation.421 She also testified that there was a teenager who was
either pregnant or had had a child in every one of the nineteen
412. See 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 230-31 (explaining that many non-
related people live in the same dwelling on the ranch); see also Bishop’s Record, supra
note 90 (referring to all the housing on YFZ Ranch as Residence R17).
413. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 230.
414. Id.
415. § 261.001(5).
416. Id. § 261.001(5)(B)-(C).
417. Compare id. § 71.005 with § 263.001(a)(3) (defining household in exactly the same
words).
418. See id. §§ 71.005, 261.001(5)(B) (defining the person who is responsible for a child’s
welfare as a member of the child’s household and defining a household as a group of people
living in the same dwelling).
419. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 199, 221-22.
420. Id. at 225-26.
421. Id. at 226.
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residences on the ranch — even though she did not go into every
single residence or talk to all the residents in each residence.422
One of the parents’ attorneys challenged the court, stating that
the Department was “trying to proceed on a one-size fits all cookie-
cutter approach to a whole lot of different families . . . [and] individual
parents.” 423 He further stated that he did not think it was “fair to
ask the Court to make a decision on four hundred plus children based
on global allegations, rather than giving the Court the benefit of spe-
cific facts or allegations against people whom the Court is being asked
to separate from the children.” 424 Clearly, all of the families did not
live in the same dwelling. There were nineteen units on the YFZ
Ranch,425 but no way to tell who lived where without testimony and
cooperation of parents.426 Very few parents testified to show where
and with whom they lived.427
The law requires due process for each child regarding the state’s
burden to prove an immediate danger to the physical health and
safety of that child.428 The state cannot lump sexual abuse, or risk
of sexual abuse, on all 468 children living in various homes on the
YFZ Ranch without “sufficient evidence.” 429 Ms. Voss submitted her
evidence of the twenty young women who gave birth when they were
seventeen years old or younger and the seven teenagers who con-
ceived their children at the age of fifteen years or younger.430 Rather
than grouping together all 468 children into one household, DFPS
should have filed suit against the parents of those teenagers who
were seventeen years old and younger who had given birth already
and/or were currently pregnant minors. Once such a suit was filed,
the children who lived in the same house as those teenagers also could
have been removed.431 This would have given DFPS’s argument more
credibility, and it likely would have been able to prove the first ele-
ment under section 262.201(b) along with the testimony and evidence
422. 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 30-31.
423. Id. at 29.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 30.
426. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 233-34.
427. See id. at 3 (showing that only four mothers and no fathers testified at the hearing).
428. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
429. Id. § 262.201(b).
430. 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 30; see also CPS Investigator’s Chart, supra
note 20 (listing seven girls who conceived at fifteen years of age or younger, and twenty
girls who gave birth at seventeen years of age or younger).
431. See, e.g., § 262.201(d) (“In determining whether there is a continuing danger to
the physical health or safety of the child, the court may consider whether the household
to which the child would be returned includes a person who . . . has sexually abused
another child.”).
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presented by Ms. Voss.432 One reason for the failure of the FLDS
removal was the over-inclusion of hundreds of children by DFPS in
the same “household” when the actual facts could not substantiate
its assertion.433
2. No Due Process
The law of the land provides that parents should have adequate
due process when the state intervenes in their private family life
and removes a child because of an allegation of abuse or neglect.434
The Texas Supreme Court describes the relationship between a par-
ent and a child as a constitutionally protected right “far more pre-
cious than property rights.” 435 Furthermore, the Texas Family Code
provides that each child should have a full adversarial hearing to
determine if the state has met its burden of proof for removal under
section 262.201.436
Though the lower court opined that it could not determine
another way to proceed without violating the statute mandating the
fourteen-day hearing, case law supported that the trial court does
not lose jurisdiction over the case if the full adversary hearing is not
held within the prescribed period of fourteen days.437 Strategically,
it was in DFPS’s interest to file a motion for continuance in order to
seek additional information to confirm the parentage of the 468 chil-
dren in its care as well as provide CASA and the AALs adequate
432. § 262.201(b)(1); see 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 30 (stating that there
was either a teenaged mother or a pregnant teen in every house the witness entered).
433. See In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2-*3 (Tex. App.
May 22, 2008) (mem.) (acknowledging DFPS’s argument that the entire ranch was one
household, but not finding it persuasive).
434. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) (“The fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child [guaran-
teed under the Fourteenth Amendment] does not evaporate simply because they have
not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”). A
parental rights termination proceeding interferes with that fundamental liberty interest.
Id. at 753. “When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide
the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.” Id. at 753-54. See In re E.D.L., 105
S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. App. 2003), in which the court agreed with the Texas Department
of Protective and Regulatory Services (TDPRS) “that the purpose of section 262 is to
afford parents the opportunity to challenge TDPRS’s right to retain any children whom
TDPRS has taken into custody under an ex parte order from the court.”
435. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1976)).
436. § 262.201(a).
437. See, e.g., In re B.T., 154 S.W.3d 200, 207 (Tex. App. 2004) (“The trial court does
not lose jurisdiction if it fails to timely conduct the hearing. Instead, the remedy for the
parent and TDPRS is to compel the trial court by mandamus to conduct the adversarial
hearing promptly.”).
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opportunity to meet and interview all of their clients prior to the
fourteen-day hearing. An additional period of time could have helped
with the logistics and presentation of the case by all parties.
Another solution that would have allowed DFPS to provide a due
process hearing for each child or group of siblings would have been to
file a preliminary petition alleging abuse and neglect, while securing
a safety plan for the children to remain in Texas in the custody of the
mothers.438 Such a petition would not require a temporary removal
order because the state would request to be appointed temporary
managing conservator along with a protective parent.439 Thus, a due
process hearing would not have to be scheduled within fourteen days,
and could be scheduled promptly at such a time as DFPS could deter-
mine parentage. The safety plan could have included voluntary DNA
testing as well as the agreement of the mothers to keep all FLDS men
off the YFZ Ranch during the pendency of the case or until the hear-
ing.440 This would have allowed the women and children to remain
in their homes, and the cost to the state would have been the price of
utilizing security, the local police force, or the Texas Guard to guard
against, for example, unauthorized persons coming on the ranch. If an
incident or violation of the safety plan arose, DFPS could have re-
moved or instigated legal action for removal of the children, and its
actions in developing the safety plan would have helped demonstrate
at a subsequent fourteen-day hearing that it made reasonable efforts
to prevent removal of the children from their homes.441 Likely fewer
children would have been removed from the ranch in the first place,
and DFPS would still have had access to the ranch and the children.
There is an argument that the State of Texas sacrificed due pro-
cess of the children and parents in order to gain access to the docu-
ments on the ranch and have the court order DNA testing before
438. See §§ 105.001(a)(1), 262.001(a) (Vernon 2008 & Supp. 2009) (allowing the govern-
ment to request to be appointed as a temporary conservator of the child); Tex. Dep’t of
Family & Protective Servs., Child Protective Services Handbook §§ 2234.33, 2234.4-.41,
available at http://dfps.state.tx.us/handbooks/CPS/Files/CPS_pg_2234.4.jsp (last visited
Feb. 7, 2010) [hereinafter CPS Handbook] (defining a safety plan as a written agreement
between DFPS and a cooperative parent to protect the safety of the child while the child
remains in the home with a protective parent).
439. See §§ 105.001(a)(1), 262.205(a)-(e) (allowing the court to appoint a temporary
conservator of the child, and allowing the state to request such an order).
440. See CPS Handbook, supra note 438, § 2234.33 (describing the types of conditions
the safety plan may contain, including “[t]he worker may develop as many safety plans
with as many persons as needed for the individual circumstances”).
441. See § 262.201(b)(3) (permitting the court to disallow returning a child to his or her
parent if the court finds, inter alia, that “reasonable efforts have been made to enable the
child to return home, but there [remains] a substantial risk of continuing danger if the
child is returned home”).
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women and children fled the state.442 The DNA testing was and is
important to the criminal prosecution of multiple FLDS men indicted
on criminal charges of sexual assault and bigamy.443 As mentioned
earlier, the DNA testing and evidence gathered from the raid was key
to the conviction of Raymond Jessop, the first polygamist sect member
tried for sexual assault of a child.444 It was arguably easier to bypass
procedural and privacy rights in the civil child protection suit, as op-
posed to adhering to more strict guidelines and objections to securing
this same evidence under criminal rules of procedure and evidence.445
The likelihood is low, however, that Texas planned its strategy out
with such detail. Of course, the failed DFPS removal may not be such
a failure after all if the facts gathered during the civil case secure the
pleas and criminal convictions of the alleged twelve perpetrators.
3. Religion versus Abuse
The crux of the legal case against the FLDS parents was that the
authoritarian belief system that allowed underage marriage and sex
with minors was abusive.446 DFPS asserted that this belief system not
only affected the girls but was detrimental to the boys in that it taught
them to replicate the sexual abuse when they reached adulthood.447
The state’s expert witness, Dr. Bruce Perry, testified that although
there were elements of the community that were healthy with respect
to raising children, “the element of their belief system that allow[ed]
underage marriage and marital relations between thirteen-, fourteen-,
fifteen-year-old kid[s] and a grown adult [was] abusive.” 448
Dr. Perry testified about the belief system’s emphasis on obedi-
ence and the group’s motivation for compliance: to honor God.449 He
further testified that the children were not given the opportunity to
make real choices because they were only presented with “the appear-
ance of a choice.” 450 The so-called choices involved “one side . . . packed
442. See, e.g., Ben Winslow, Dates Set for Trials of 12 FLDS Men, DESERET NEWS,
Jan. 13, 2009, at A06 (noting Willie Jessop’s belief that law enforcement had “an agenda”
all along, and was never on the ranch to search for sixteen-year-old Sarah Jessop).
443. See Choate, supra note 374 (discussing the importance of DNA evidence at
Raymond M. Jessop’s trial).
444. Id.
445. See supra Part I.B (discussing the relatively low evidentiary standards for child
protection suits).
446. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.).
447. Id.
448. 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 73.
449. Id. at 73-74.
450. Id. at 75.
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with all kinds of good things” and the other side “packed with not so
good things.” 451 Dr. Perry testified that this lack of offering the chil-
dren independent choice hindered their brain development such that
they only possessed the capability of a six- to ten-year-old to make
independent decisions.452 Dr. Perry ultimately stated that fostering
an environment where children will grow up to have “a high potential
of replicating sexual abuse of . . . children” and are unable to develop
their decision-making capacities was neglectful.453 Further, arguments
were made regarding the alleged excommunication of young male
teens from the FLDS due to their rebellion against the community’s
ideals, and a growing interest in the “secular” world.454
The United States Supreme Court has long held that religion
cannot be used to excuse acts of abuse, and that the state has the
authority to intervene in the private life of families in order to pro-
tect a child from harm:
[T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest,
as against a claim of religious liberty. And neither rights of reli-
gion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to
guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as
parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor and
in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because
the parent grounds his claim to control the child’s course of con-
duct on religion or conscience . . . . [T]he state has a wide range
of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child’s welfare . . . this includes, to some extent,
matters of conscience and religious conviction.455
It has also been settled that the state has authority to regulate
actions that are prompted by religious beliefs.456 “Laws are made for
the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” 457 Freedom
451. Id. at 74-75.
452. Id. at 81-82.
453. Id. at 77-82.
454. See id. at 219-23 (discussing the “lost boys” phenomenon); see also Brieanne M.
Billie, Note, The “Lost Boys” of Polygamy: Is Emancipation the Answer?, 12 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 127, 134, 138, 141-43 (2008) (asserting that in order for polygamy to
operate successfully, “church leaders . . . [keep] the male population in check to reduce
the competition for suitable brides,” and, as a result of excommunication, young FLDS
teens may be left homeless as well as economically, socially, educationally, and psycho-
logically ill-equipped to live outside the FLDS community).
455. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (citations omitted).
456. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“Laws . . . cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, [but] they may with practices.”).
457. Id.
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of expression and religion cannot be used to excuse actions which
are prohibited by law.458 The Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United
States made it clear that doctrines of religious belief could not be
made superior to the law of the land without creating an ineffective
government.459
In terms of regulating beliefs covered under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, there is an established method of
determining when government may regulate conduct prompted by
religious beliefs.460 Prior to 1990, the government was required to
justify the imposition of a substantial burden on a religious practice
with a compelling state interest.461 When applying the pre-1990 stan-
dard, courts considered: (1) whether the law interfered with the free
exercise of a sincere religious belief; (2) whether the law was “essential
to accomplish an overriding governmental” objective; and (3) whether
accommodating the religious conduct would “unduly interfere with
fulfillment of the governmental interest.” 462
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether the state’s compulsory school attendance laws vio-
lated the First Amendment rights of members of the Amish religion.463
The Supreme Court held that the parents could not be punished for
violation of the compulsory education laws.464 The Court placed a
value on the Amish system of vocational training, determining that
the young Amish people were receiving education that would pre-
pare them for life within their community.465 Since their community
had a history of productive citizenship, the Court reasoned that it
was unlikely that the Amish children would become a burden on
society.466 The alternative of enforcing the compulsory education laws
on the Amish would have, according to the majority, interfered with
the parents’ long-standing practice of religious inculcation of their
children and exposed the children to an environment hostile to
Amish beliefs.467
458. Id. at 166-67.
459. Id.
460. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972).
461. See, e.g., id. at 214 (requiring the state to provide an interest that can overcome
the interest in maintaining the free exercise of religion; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 403 (1963) (using a compelling state interest test). But see Employment Div., Dep’t
of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-89 (1990) (holding the compelling state
interest test inapplicable).
462. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-59 (1982).
463. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
464. Id. at 235-36.
465. Id. at 222.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 211, 222.
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In Sherbert v. Verner, the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a South Carolina statute violated the appellant’s First
Amendment rights by disqualifying her from receiving unemploy-
ment benefits after she refused to work on Saturday, which was her
religion’s Sabbath Day.468 The Court upheld the appellant’s claim to
a free exercise of religion exemption because the employer failed to
demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat
abuses of this exemption (the filing of fraudulent claims feigning reli-
gious objections) without infringing First Amendment rights.469
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court retreated from the
Yoder and Sherbert test and held that the First Amendment does not
prohibit governments from burdening religious practices through
neutral, generally applicable laws.470 In Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme Court
concluded that the “right of free exercise does not relieve an individual
of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law [prohibits] conduct that his
religion prescribes.’ ” 471 Smith involved two employees who were fired
from their employment because they ingested peyote while partic-
ipating in a religious ceremony of the Native American Church.472
They applied for unemployment compensation benefits which the
Employment Division denied because their employer had discharged
them for work-related misconduct.473 The Oregon Court of Appeals
reversed based on its conclusion that the denial of benefits violated
the free exercise rights of the two employees as protected by the First
Amendment.474 The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.475 Employment
Division sought certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court
granted.476 The Court reversed, determining that the Sherbert test
which required a compelling government interest does not apply
where the challenged state action that allegedly inhibits the free
exercise of religion is a generally applicable criminal law.477 Justice
Scalia further stated that the only cases where the Court has “held
that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the
468. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
469. Id. at 407, 410.
470. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
471. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
472. Id. at 874.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 875.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 884-85.
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Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in con-
junction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of
speech and of the press.” 478 In these hybrid situations, strict scrutiny
is applied.479
There is a conflict that exists within constitutional law when the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is applied to a parent’s
ability to influence his or her child’s actions through speech and the
state’s ability to intervene in private family life in order to protect
a child from harm.480 The significance of the Texas Court of Appeals
statement regarding the imposition of certain tenets of a belief system
on a child is underscored in Shepp v. Shepp, a Pennsylvania case
which dealt with the issue of whether the courts could disallow
parents from advocating religious tenets that, if acted upon, would
constitute criminal conduct.481 This case dealt directly with the issue
of bigamy within a polygamist sect, and evaluated whether a father
could be prohibited from teaching his minor female child about polyg-
amy, plural marriages or multiple wives.482 The mother and father
were Mormons when they married in 1992, and were divorced in
2001.483 The Mormon church excommunicated the father for the same
reason the mother divorced him: the father was a fundamentalist
who believed in polygamy.484 The mother “expressed concerns that
[the father] would introduce [their daughter] Kaylynne to men so that
she would be ready to engage in polygamy once she reache[d] the age
of thirteen.” 485
The father denied that he would try to marry Kaylynne into a
polygamist relationship, but that “it [was] his job to help her learn
about and understand alternatives.” 486 Manda, a daughter of the
mother from a previous marriage, “testified that when she was
thirteen years old, [the f]ather (who [was] her stepfather) told her
‘that if you didn’t practice polygamy . . . you were going to hell.’ ” 487
The father further told his stepdaughter that in Pennsylvania a
fourteen-year-old could get married with a parent’s permission, and
suggested the two of them should wed because they already resided
478. Id. at 881.
479. See id. at 881-86 (declining to use strict scrutiny for non-hybrid cases).
480. See, e.g., Shepp v. Shepp, 906 A.2d 1165, 1168-69 (Pa. 2006) (highlighting the
conflict between the Free Exercise Clause and parental autonomy to raise children).
481. Id. at 1174.
482. Id. at 1167-68.
483. Id. at 1166.
484. Id. at 1166-67.
485. Id. at 1167.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 1168.
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in the house together and were already related.488 The father denied
Manda’s allegation.489
The trial court noted that “[c]ontact [between a parent and a
child] can be limited only when the parent has been shown to suffer
from severe mental or moral deficiencies that constitute a grave
threat to the child.” 490 The trial court further found that there was
no evidence of a grave threat to the child in this case, even though
evidence of a moral deficiency may have existed because of the father’s
belief in plural marriage.491 The trial court allowed the parents to con-
tinue raising the child in the Mormon faith, but specifically barred
the father from teaching her about multiple wives, polygamy, or
plural marriages while the child was a minor.492
The father appealed the case to the superior court which affirmed
the lower court’s decision, but disagreed with the finding that the
father did not pose a grave threat to his daughter.493 The superior
court stated that the:
Father’s promotion of his beliefs to his stepdaughter involved not
merely the superficial exposure of a child to the theoretical notion
of criminal conduct, but constituted a vigorous attempt at moral
suasion and recruitment by threats of future punishment. The
child was, in fact, warned that only by committing an illicit act
could she comply with the requirements of her religion.494
The superior court expressed additional trepidation that the father’s
desire to instill a belief in polygamy in his daughter would “ ‘become
insistence that she engage in such conduct.’ ” 495
On appeal from the father, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed the order of the superior court.496 The majority stated that:
This case implicates two highly important values: the free exercise
of religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment . . . and the
public policy of this Commonwealth, as set forth in section 5301
of the Domestic Relations Code, “when in the best interest of the
child, to assure a reasonable and continuing contact of the child
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id. (citation omitted).
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id. (citation omitted).
495. Id.
496. Id. at 1174.
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with both parents after a separation or dissolution of the marriage
and a sharing of the rights and responsibilities of child rearing
by both parents.” 497
The state supreme court found that advocating Mormon fundamen-
talism did not constitute a grave threat of harm to the child, and con-
cluded there was insufficient basis in the instant case for the court
to encroach upon the father’s constitutional right to discuss religion
with his child as he saw fit.498 Second, the court held that:
a court may prohibit a parent from advocating religious beliefs,
which, if acted upon, would constitute a crime. However, . . . it may
do so only where it is established that advocating the prohibited
conduct would jeopardize the physical or mental health or safety
of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens.499
The court applied the strict scrutiny analysis to this hybrid case, and
ruled that the father’s constitutional rights under the Free Exercise
Clause and the state public policy of encouraging contact between
children and divorced parents outweighed the state’s authority under
the parens patriae doctrine.500
In Shepp, the father argued that “he [was] simply a parent who
wishe[d] to share his sincere religious beliefs with his child.” 501 In
support of his view that the courts may not interfere with this right,
he relied upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
which recognized “that only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the
free exercise of religion.” 502 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling
in Shepp would appear to support the Texas Supreme Court decision
in the YFZ case, in that Texas could not establish that the prohibited
conduct (i.e., the pervasive belief system) jeopardized the physical
or mental health or safety of all the children, or possessed a potential
to impose significant social burdens. There is a strong argument to be
made, however, that physical or mental health of the pregnant FLDS
minors on the ranch was at risk.503 The dissenting judge in Shepp and
Professor Jeffrey Shulman argue that the strict scrutiny standard
gives too much deference to the parent’s claim of constitutional rights
497. Id. at 1168-69 (quoting 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 2001)).
498. Id. at 1174.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 1169.
502. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Shepp, 906 A.2d at 1169.
503. See Roberts, supra note 52 (pointing out that at least one sexual assault was
committed at the YFZ Ranch).
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without considering the coercive nature of religious beliefs in the
familial context, as well as society’s interest in regulating immoral
and criminal conduct.504 In addition, as the concurring opinion of
Justice Eakin in Shepp points out, the case called for an analysis of
the best interests of the child by a preponderance of the evidence —
like any child custody case — rather than a strict scrutiny analysis.505
This improperly elevated the father’s fundamental right to raise his
daughter over the mother’s fundamental right.506
While the civil case before the Court of Appeals in Texas ad-
dressed the issue of whether there was sufficient risk of harm to the
FLDS children that would warrant their removal from home,507 an
underlying fact supported future criminal charges — the birth of
children to minor females fathered by men on the YFZ Ranch.508 Sex
crimes were implicit in the circumstances of these young girls, and
the district court in Texas saw the potential risk of future harm for
the children.509 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in Shepp
gives a peek into what may lead to a United States Supreme Court
review in the future.510 The critical decision that must be made is the
process by which a court should determine when or how mental or
emotional harm impairs a child’s feeling of safety in his or her home.
C. Every Child is Not Protected
“The men in power get the young girls,” says Roger Hoole, a
name partner with Hoole & King in Salt Lake City who represents
former FLDS members. “The problem is not really polygamy; the
problem is the belief that women and children are unilaterally
the property of the priesthood, and they raise the girls from the
cradle to grow up and be mothers and plural wives. It’s all the
girls have ever known.”
504. See Shepp, 906 A.2d at 1179-80 (Baer, J., dissenting) (stating that Pennsylvania
should take into consideration the state’s interest in protecting the public welfare); Jeffrey
Shulman, What Yoder Wrought: Religious Disparagement, Parental Alienation and the
Best Interests of the Child, 53 VILL. L. REV. 173, 174 (2008) (arguing that “the law grants
the religiously motivated parent a special constitutional privilege . . . , a privilege that
generally trumps any countervailing interests of the state or rights of the child”).
505. Shepp, 906 A.2d at 1174-75 (Eakin, J., concurring).
506. Id.
507. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00325-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1, *4 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.).
508. Id. at *1-*2.
509. See 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 340 (finding that the requirements of
section 262 had been met); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b)(2) (Vernon Supp.
2009) (requiring an urgent need to remove the child because of danger to the child’s
physical safety or health).
510. Shepp, 906 A.2d at 1174 (“[A] court may prohibit a parent from advocating religious
beliefs which, if acted upon, would constitute a crime.”).
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Choate adds, “I hope the lesson learned isn’t that if you have
enough people, and their actions are confusing or duplicitous, you
can do what you want. Because if that’s the case, the state doesn’t
have any power to protect the most vulnerable.” 511
There is a question regarding whether the religion that the FLDS
practice is mentally or emotionally abusive to children. One might
argue that extremists of all religions could be considered abusive512 —
does this mean that children who belong to outlier religions are always
at greater risk of being removed? A further question that arises is
at what point is a mental or emotional injury to a child deemed an
immediate danger to the child? Several factors must be considered
when determining whether psychological maltreatment can be sub-
stantiated: the “[l]evel of severity and chronicity or duration of the
caregiver behavior are the guiding standards used by most states to
identify behavior as” abusive.513
“In most cases, psychological maltreatment is substantiated when
a chronic pattern is identified.” 514 For example, “[m]any caregivers
occasionally ask a child to take on inappropriate responsibilities;
psychologically neglectful parents do this routinely (e.g., a [seven]-
year-old makes most of the family decisions because her mother is
high most of the time).” 515 Sometimes, “caregiver behavior is so severe
that a case will be substantiated on the basis of a single incident (e.g.,
shaving a girl’s hair off to humiliate her or encouraging the child to
get high with the parent).” 516 Arguably, if a parent forced or coerced
an underage child to marry or engage in sexual acts with an adult,
it would likely qualify under the above-described standards as psycho-
logical maltreatment.
The simple fact of the matter is that the Texas Family Code does
not provide DFPS the opportunity to remove children on an emer-
gency basis because of emotional or mental abuse.517 The emergency
removal standard allows for children to be removed when their phys-
ical health or safety are in danger or when they have been victimized
511. Stephanie Francis Ward, Discovering Eldorado, 94 A.B.A. J., Oct. 2008, at 70.
512. See Richard Dawkins, RichardDawkins.net, Religion’s Real Child Abuse (May 15,
2006), http://richarddawkins.net/articles/118 (discussing how certain religious teachings
can be considered mental abuse); see also Posting of revere to Scienceblogs, http://science
blogs.com/effectmeasure/2009/11/freethinker_sunday_sermonette_177.php (Nov. 8, 2009,
06:24 EST) (discussing how some kinds of religious upbringing can be considered abusive).
513. NELSON J. BINGGELI ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN 54
(2001).
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 55.
517. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (taking into consid-
eration only whether the child’s physical health or safety have been endangered).
2010] THE TEXAS MIS-STEP 509
by neglect or sexual abuse.518 Although emotional or mental abuse
is included in the definition of “abuse” in the Texas Family Code,519
it is not part of the legal removal standard.520 In actuality, “[p]sycho-
logical maltreatment is the most common form of child abuse” be-
cause it is present in almost every case of physical abuse, physical
neglect, and sexual abuse.521 Legal experts assert that “the severest
trauma of child sexual abuse is not the physical act, but rather the
emotional repercussions of the abuse, including the abuse of power,
betrayal of trust, intimidation, threats, shame, and guilt.” 522 While
the DFPS investigator and an expert witness in the YFZ case testified
that the children were being emotionally abused, this ultimately was
insufficient under state law to warrant removal.523
A prime example of the psychological maltreatment that goes
on within the FLDS is demonstrated in the recounting of a teenage
girl’s experience between the time she found out she would be married
to her first cousin at the age of fourteen and the day of her marriage.524
Elissa Wall recalls becoming the teenage bride of her first cousin at
fourteen years of age:
I had been in the FLDS Church from the moment I was born. It
was all I knew and the only way I could imagine living. From my
teachings, I knew that the prophet’s job was to dictate what was
best for us and that the words he spoke came straight from God.
I believed that my impending marriage was the will of God and
therefore nothing could be done to stop it. But still, I had to try.
I also knew that I was different from other girls in my com-
munity. I wanted an education, and maybe even to become a nurse
or teacher someday. During my year in public school, I’d come to
realize things were possible that I’d never dreamed before. Sure,
I knew that I wanted to be a mother of good priesthood children,
but not at fourteen. I wanted children and a future, and I dared
to think that both were possible.
. . . .
. . . Getting married is the highest honor for a girl in the
FLDS Church. It was what women lived for — our dream and
518. Id. §§ 262.101(1), .102(a)-(b), .104(a), .107(a)-(b), .201(b) (Vernon 2008 & Supp.
2009).
519. Id. § 261.101(1)(A),(B), (4)(A) (Vernon 2008).
520. See sources cited supra note 518 (examining the Texas Family Code sections that
allow removal of a child).
521. BINGGELI ET AL., supra note 513, at xi.
522. ANN M. HARALAMBIE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN CIVIL CASES: A GUIDE TO CUSTODY
AND TORT ACTIONS 364 (1999).
523. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 277; 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15,
at 73, 133.
524. ELISSA WALL WITH LISA PULITZ, STOLEN INNOCENCE 1 (2008).
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our mission. Even though I was only fourteen, it was hard not to
get caught up in all the excitement. Soon, though, those feelings
would pass, and the anxiety returned.525
Elissa wrote about two other girls who were assigned husbands at
the same time as her, and described how one girl attempted suicide
because her marriage announcement appeared to be a reaction to an
improper friendship she had developed with an older FLDS boy.526
She also wrote about how her mother interrupted her while she was
writing down her thoughts of what was happening in her journal,
telling her that her words were not private and that she should write
things that she would not regret later.527 Elissa makes clear in her
book that the actions and inactions of her mother supported the
illegal marriage that she tried so hard to avoid.528
Another significant impact of being a teenage bride that Elissa
recounts is the fact that she was subject to forced sex throughout her
marriage to her first cousin, which resulted in three pregnancies, the
outcome of which was two miscarriages and a stillbirth by the age
of sixteen.529 Elissa had no choice in the matter of her sexual life —
much like that of other young girls around the world who are in forced
marriages.530 Other women who have escaped the FLDS lifestyle also
recount being brainwashed and abused.531 Elissa Wall was able to find
justice within the criminal law system, as she was the star witness
in the prosecution of Warren Jeffs in Utah for being an accomplice
to rape.532 Until psychological abuse is specifically recognized within
the removal statute in Texas, though, it will be difficult to show that
there is an immediate danger to children living in FLDS communi-
ties when their circumstances are not as harrowing as Elissa Wall’s.
Moreover, United States courts will need to resolve the ultimate issue
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered in Shepp: the level
of psychological or emotional harm necessary to prove grave danger
525. Id. at 125, 127.
526. Id. at 127.
527. Id. at 128.
528. See, e.g., id. (illustrating Wall’s anxiety resulting from her mother’s words about
her diary not being private).
529. Id. at 167, 185, 236, 239.
530. See, e.g., Karine Belair, Unearthing the Customary Law Foundations of “Forced
Marriages” During Sierra Leone’s Civil War: An Analysis of the Possible Impact of
International Criminal Law on Customary Marriages and Women’s Rights in Post-
Conflict Sierra Leone, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551, 551-52 (2006) (describing the process,
sometimes violent, by which women are forced into marriage and the lack of control they
have over their sexual lives).
531. FLORA JESSOP & PAUL T. BROWN, CHURCH OF LIES 3, 16-17 (2009).
532. WALL WITH PULITZ, supra note 524, at 352.
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to a child which would enable the states’ parens patriae powers to
trump Free Exercise Clause claims by parents.533
D. Who is the Victimized Child?
1. No Sexual Abuse Outcry
At the onset of the investigation, the YFZ Ranch was raided by
state and federal troopers as well as DFPS.534 DFPS underestimated
the number of children who would be found on the ranch, and as a re-
sult was overwhelmed with how to go about interviewing the chil-
dren without their parents, in a manner designed to yield DFPS the
most information about their home life.535 In a typical case, a child
who makes an allegation about sexual or physical abuse is taken to
a local child advocacy center where forensic interviewers videotape
an interview of child.536 During the interview, a police detective, the
DFPS and/or district attorney, and a DFPS investigative worker ob-
serve and provide feedback and questions to the forensic interviewer
for the child.537 The multidisciplinary team can then discuss the child’s
case and offer suggestions on how to proceed with the potential crim-
inal and civil suits.538 DFPS was not able to transport the children to
the local child advocacy center in this case, and had a difficult time
interviewing children outside of the presence of their mothers.539
“The Primer,” a joint report of Utah and Arizona Attorney
General’s Offices, explains the FLDS culture and provides guidelines
for people attempting to help victims from polygamous communities.540
The Primer’s findings are similar to those of Livia Bardin, M.S.W., in
her article “Child Protection in an Authoritarian Community: Culture
533. See Shepp v. Shepp, 906 A.2d 1165, 1178-79 (Pa. 2006) (discussing the tension
between allowing parents to teach their children certain religious beliefs and the state’s
interest in protecting children from harm).
534. See supra Part I (describing the raid on the YFZ Ranch).
535. See, e.g., 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 223-24 (describing the somewhat
chaotic environment in which the children were being interviewed).
536. Theodore P. Cross et al., Child Forensic Interviewing in Children’s Advocacy
Centers: Empirical Date on a Practice Model, 31 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1031, 1032-33
(2007).
537. See id. at 1033 (discussing the use of interdisciplinary teams to increase the
effectiveness of the interviews).
538. See id. (noting that the interdisciplinary teams share decision-making respon-
sibilities).
539. E.g., 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 223-24; 4 Reporter’s Record, supra
note 15, at 160-62.
540. UTAH ATTORNEY GEN. OFFICE & ARIZ. ATTORNEY GEN. OFFICE, THE PRIMER: A
GUIDEBOOK FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCIES WHO OFFER
ASSISTANCE TO FUNDAMENTALIST MORMON FAMILIES 7-9 (2009), available at http://www
.attorneygeneral.utah.gov/polygamy/The Primer.pdf [hereinafter THE PRIMER].
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Clash and Systemic Weakness.” 541 Bardin is a clinical social worker
with a background in child welfare and a specialty in problems of
cult involvement.542 She investigated allegations stemming from
Arizona and Utah that CPS avoids intervention in fundamentalist
Mormon communities (FMCs).543
As part of her investigation, Bardin conducted a limited survey
of former members of FMCs to get information about their personal
childhood experiences of abuse and neglect and any interactions they
had with CPS.544 She also interviewed CPS workers who had inter-
acted with FMC members.545 Bardin reviewed accounts of women in
isolated, authoritarian groups, who may suppress their own instincts
and sanction a leader’s “mistreatment or even removal of their chil-
dren.” 546 Most participants, though not all, reported ongoing abuse
during childhood, including physical abuse such as regularly “being
kicked, whipped, beaten, shaken, shoved off balance[,] or knocked
down.” 547 Even though all of the respondents had repudiated FMC
beliefs, most did not identify marriage of teenage girls to much older
men as sexual abuse,548 regarding it instead as curtailment of choice.
Bardin identified several factors that complicate CPS investigations
in FMCs, which include: (1) children may be uncooperative because
they subscribe to the group’s beliefs or fear being returned to the com-
munity after cooperating, where they would be punished for their
cooperation;549 (2) CPS workers may feel intimidated;550 (3) practical
difficulties such as the geographic isolation of some rural communities,
which makes it hard for workers to arrive without notice and easy
for families under investigation to disappear;551 (4) the large number
of children per family (one worker spoke of trying to interview forty-
two children) and lack of privacy make it difficult to interview all
those involved;552 and (5) the political power of FMCs in rural areas
may affect the willingness of elected officials to move promptly and
541. See Livia Bardin, Child Protection in an Authoritarian Community: Culture
Clash and Systemic Weakness, 4 CULTIC STUD. REV. 233, 233 (2005) (exploring whether
CPS in Utah and Arizona avoid interventions in polygamous Mormon communities).
542. International Cultic Studies Association: Profiles, Livia Bardin, M.S.W., http://
www.icsahome.com/infoserv_profile/bardin_livia.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
543. Bardin, supra note 541, at 233.
544. Id. at 235.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 238.
548. See id. at 237, 239 tbl.1 (showing “only [one] respondent who connected underage
marriage with sexual abuse”).
549. Id. at 247.
550. Id. at 245-46.
551. Id. at 236.
552. Id. at 246.
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appropriately, while the FMCs’ readiness to accuse investigators of
prejudice may have a chilling effect on enforcement agencies.553
In the YFZ hearing itself, the state’s expert witness, Dr. Bruce
Perry, stated that because of the nature of how the children were
raised to fear outsiders, it would be unlikely that they would feel
comfortable talking to DFPS investigators.554 In addition, according
to Utah psychologist Larry Beall, the nature and “basic structure of
polygamy is authoritarian and secretive.” 555 Dr. Beall states that
“[t]he men who practice it believe they have the authority to govern
and control their wives and children in the family relationship,” and
that this “control can take extreme forms.” 556 According to Dr. Beall,
a psychologist who has worked with polygamous families for many
years,557 the prominent characteristics of polygamous cults558 include:
(1) a controlling central figure; (2) “[r]evelation from God dictates the
words and acts of the central figure”; (3) “[i]ndependent thinking and
outside information are shunned”; (4) “[r]elationships with others out-
side the cult are prohibited”; (5) unfavorable attitudes about educa-
tion; (6) society is presented as evil, wicked, and dangerous; (7) group
members are policed to prevent disloyalty; (8) violence is exerted
against women and children to maintain control; (9) “[e]motional ex-
pressions are undesirable”; (10) “[p]ersonal desires are unwanted”;
(11) imposition of a patriarchal caste system; and (12) women viewed
as property or possession.559
With regard to the caste system, Dr. Beall states that one of the
reasons there is such disparity between the reports from those who
have fled polygamy and those who remain in polygamy has to do with
the function of women within this hierarchy and the accoutrements
553. Id. at 249.
554. 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 70.
555. Larry Beall, Trauma Awareness & Treatment Center TATC, The Impact of Modern-
Day Polygamy on Women & Children, http://www.traumaawareness.org/id19.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2010).
556. Id.
557. See Brooke Adams, Sentence is Expected Tuesday for FLDS Man, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Nov. 10, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 22493252 (“Utah psychologist Larry Beall,
who specializes in trauma, told jurors that over his 21-year career he had counseled 20
former FLDS members, five of whom were women.”).
558. The author defines a cult as having three elements:
(1) doctrinal teachings and practices, which because of their emotionally,
physically, or sexually abusive nature, would be judged by society outside
the cult, as destructive, harmful, and/or criminal; (2) coercion or force by its
leaders to insure [sic] compliance in the cult’s members[;] and (3) secrecy to
prevent influence from the outside society and to maintain isolation of its
members.
Beall, supra note 555.
559. Id.
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that accompany their individual status in the family.560 Plural wives
who are devoted and supportive of the policies and teachings of the
prophet “will receive superior living conditions and better treatment
within their group. This differential between living standards may
explain why some plural wives report only positive aspects of their
polygamous experiences.” 561
Older female children who are already wives may be taught that
telling an outsider about abuse risks publicizing the fact that indi-
viduals in the FLDS community clearly disobey anti-bigamy laws.562
“[T]his attention [could] lead to the destruction of their famil[ies], com-
munit[ies], or marriage, [by] forcing a potential witness or victim . . .
to choose between reporting the crime and endangering his or her
family structure and way of life.” 563 In this way, FLDS members are
marginalized, and “as long as polygamy remains a crime, the state
cannot expect the people within polygamist communities to cooperate
in finding and reporting abuse.” 564 Considering the history of FLDS
interaction with state child protection agencies, the normal method
of interviewing children and potential witnesses of abuse does not
work with this population.565
Without a cooperative child victim in the YFZ case, the state’s
case began to unravel because there was no first-hand personal testi-
mony of a witness who had actually made an accusation that a man
in her household had physically or sexually abused her.566 In many
cases of abuse, a child tells someone that her caregiver has done some-
thing to her that qualifies as abuse under the law.567 In other cases,
a child may state that her caregiver has failed to do something which
qualifies as neglect under the law. In still other cases, there is physical
evidence of abuse and neglect whereby no words need be spoken by
the child, such as the presence of illegal drugs in a newborn, an
unexplained third-degree burn on a five-month-old, or the diagnosis
of a sexually transmitted disease in an eight-year-old.568 Certain
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Jeffrey Michael Hayes, Comment, Polygamy Comes Out of the Closet: The New
Strategy of Polygamy Activists, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 99, 107 (2007).
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. See id. (“[P]olygamists are well aware of the fact that the law views them as
felons.” (citation omitted)).
566. See 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 276-77 (illustrating the witness’s
inability to give an example of a child from the ranch alleging physical or mental abuse).
567. See Ramona Alaggia, Many Ways of Telling: Expanding Conceptualizations of
Child Sexual Abuse Disclosure, 28 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1213, 1218 (2004) (discussing
purposeful disclosure by victims of child abuse).
568. See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS 3-4 (2007), http://www
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situations are considered abuse per se.569 There is not always a child
victim who is verbal, and there are many cases where a lay witness
or expert witness testifies about circumstances that constitute abuse
and/or neglect of a child.570 When Sarah Jessop, also known as Sarah
Barlow, was never identified or located, DFPS turned to other evi-
dence collected to attempt to show that the children on the YFZ
Ranch were in immediate physical danger.
The only evidence that DFPS could use in order to establish the
children were in continuing physical danger was the fact that they
saw young, pregnant teenagers as well as teenagers who had borne
children.571 Since this evidence proved successful for DFPS at the ini-
tial ex parte hearing held after the children had already been taken
into custody,572 there was likely not much consideration regarding
the use of Angie Voss as the sole DFPS witness. Many times the effi-
cient use of court time is a higher priority in child welfare cases than
the strict adherence to the rules of evidence.573 The YFZ case, with
hundreds of attorneys, respondent parents, and the children who were
the subject of the suit, made the presentation of evidence even more
problematic than in regular cases. Angie Voss’s testimony proved to be
much too cursory and not specific enough to prove that all of the chil-
dren’s physical health or safety were in danger.574 In the memorandum
opinion issued by the Third Court of Appeals, the testimony of DFPS
is called into question as to the facts upon which Voss based her state-
ments.575 Had DFPS chosen to present the testimony of more DFPS
special investigators who had actually interviewed the children and/or
childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/sp_signs.cfm (giving examples of conditions that should
give immediate rise to suspicions of child abuse or neglect).
569. Christopher A. Warlick et al., Keeping Childhood Sexual Abuse on the Urologic
Radar Screen, 66 UROLOGY 1143, 1149 (2005) (explaining the necessity to report certain
genital infections to CPS regardless of additional evidence).
570. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 320, 342-43 (2004) (pointing out that some children may
have trouble testifying, and in that case witnesses can be helpful to the case).
571. Petition for Orders in Aid of Investigation of a Report of Child Abuse or Neglect,
In re Children of YFZ Ranch, No. 2904 (51st Dist. Ct., Schleicher County, Tex. Apr. 5,
2008); Affidavit in Support of Petition, supra note 2, at 5.
572. See 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 340 (finding that sufficient evidence
had been presented to convince the court that the children could be removed).
573. See Mark Hardin, Director, Nat’l Child Welfare Res. Ctr. on Legal & Judicial
Issues, Improving Courts’ Handling of Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: A List of Suggested
Reforms, at 1-2, http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/samlist.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2010)
(discussing how setting time limits for child abuse and neglect cases can improve the
litigation process and illustrating the priority given to judicial efficiency, even in child
abuse cases).
574. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3.
575. Id. at *3; see also Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 3-6 (laying out
the evidence that Angie Voss and Dr. Bruce Perry presented at the hearing).
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some of the parents of the children, it may have been able to meet
the first element of the legal standard set forth in section 262.201576
of the Texas Family Code for more than just a few children.
2. More Evidence, Please
In many DFPS cases, investigators often find other evidence
that shows neglect or abuse in addition to the primary reason for the
referral.577 This additional evidence, such as drug use, unsanitary or
unsafe living conditions, often is enough to warrant removal of the
children.578 In the YFZ case, there was enough evidence presented
at the fourteen-day hearing to prove that young teenagers were mar-
ried to older men and had borne children prior to age eighteen.579
The Father’s Family Information Sheet (Bishop’s Record), investi-
gation reports of at least five teenage girls, testimony of the FLDS
expert witness and some of the FLDS mothers corroborated the fact
that some teens were married and had children between the ages of
fifteen and seventeen.580 The law in Texas provides that the general
age requirement to marry is eighteen years old, and that a person
sixteen years old or older, but not yet eighteen, can marry only with
the consent of his or her parents.581 The Bishop’s Record did not re-
flect any wives below the age of sixteen.582 The Texas Family Code,
however, does provide that with regard to the marriage relationship,
a minor must apply to the county clerk to be married and submit
documents establishing parental consent.583 A court order may also
be executed in order to authorize the marriage of a minor.584 In any
event, no FLDS parent could give legal consent without providing
a written declaration to the county clerk.585 Thus, every marriage of
576. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (providing that “the
court shall order the return of the child to the parent . . . unless the court finds sufficient
evidence . . . that: (1) there was a danger to the physical health or safety of the child . . .
and for the child to remain in the home is contrary to the welfare of the child”).
577. See, e.g., In re A.R.B., No. 14-08-00452-CV, 2009 WL 3425358, at *1 (Tex. App.
2009) (mem.) (indicating that after the referral for severe burns on a young girl’s face,
investigators also found scarring patterns on her body consistent with other physical
abuse).
578. See In re Z.C., 280 S.W.3d 470, 474 (Tex. App. 2009) (“A parent’s illegal drug use
and drug-related criminal activity may support a finding that the child’s surroundings
endanger his physical or emotional well-being.”).
579. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1-*2.
580. See supra notes 82-91 and 168-189 (discussing the testimony of the witnesses and
the exhibits entered into evidence by the state).
581. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.101, .102(a) (Vernon 2008 & Supp. 2009).
582. Bishop’s Record, supra note 90.
583. §§ 2.003, .102.
584. Id. § 2.103.
585. Id. § 2.102(b).
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an FLDS child under the age of eighteen was nonconsensual and
illegitimate under the law.
There were exhibits admitted by DFPS that reflected DFPS inves-
tigations of nineteen teenage girls on the YFZ Ranch.586 Throughout
the documentation gathered by DFPS, there was no evidence pre-
sented in court that any of these girls stated that a man had assaulted
them physically or sexually.587 Some admitted to sexual relations with
their husbands, and others denied being touched in any kind of
sexual way or invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to answer
questions.588
There were eight additional DFPS investigative caseworkers who
interviewed the teenage mothers and the adult mothers who gave
birth in their teens on the YFZ Ranch,589 but only one investigative
supervisor testified on behalf of DFPS.590 In the interest of time, DFPS
probably did not want to present any duplicative evidence; however,
it would have been valuable to hear testimony from different wit-
nesses regarding the interviews with some of the other teenage girls
who were not part of the group of five who were pregnant. It would
also have been helpful to hear about the interviews with the teenage
boys. Many of the investigative reports contained the names of sib-
lings who lived with the teenage girls,591 and it would have been useful
to ask questions of how the marriage and subsequent births of the
teens impacted the younger children.
In one home in particular there were five sister-wives where two
of the mothers tried to cover for one another with regard to the age
of the younger wife and her child.592 The young sister-wife cried
586. See 6 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 2 (listing CPS investigative summaries
for eleven girls); 7 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 3 (listing CPS investigative sum-
maries for eight girls).
587. 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 276-77 (illustrating the investigator’s
inability to point out one instance of a girl from the ranch alleging physical abuse).
588. See id. at 195-96, 201 (noting that some girls invoked the Fifth Amendment and
that one girl acknowledged that she was pregnant at seventeen years old, necessitating
the conclusion that she was sexually active with her husband).
589. CPS Investigator’s Chart, supra note 20 (listing the names of the investigators
who interviewed teenage mothers and adult mothers who gave birth in their teens as
Tina Martinez, Rebecca Baxter, Patricia Koetter, Ruby Gutierrez, Kelly Walker, Joy
Hallum, Barbara Cockrell, and Michelle Neely).
590. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 2.
591. See, e.g., Sally Jeffs CPS Summary, supra note 185 (listing siblings who resided
in the same house as the victim, Sally Jeffs); CPS Investigation Summary: Margaret
Barlow, Petitioner’s Exhibit 8, 6 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15 (same, victim Margaret
Barlow).
592. CPS Investigation Summary: Janet Jessop, Petitioner’s Exhibit 13, 6 Reporter’s
Record, supra note 15 (“Mary [a sister-wife] started to cry and said she wanted to be
honest but she did not want to get anyone in trouble. . . . She asked to take the place of
one particular mother that had a child under the age of [eighteen].”).
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during the interview and expressed fear of getting someone in trouble
who had had a child under the age of eighteen.593 She expressed want-
ing to take that mother’s punishment.594 This testimony would have
been very relevant to determining whether there was any physical
danger to the children on the ranch in that the interviewer could have
been questioned about exactly what this “punishment” entailed.
The state did not present any other evidence regarding the risk
to the younger children, both male and female, on the YFZ Ranch.595
Since younger children under the age of ten made up 71.5% (332 chil-
dren) of the total number of children removed from the ranch,596 the
en masse hearing worked against the state’s argument that all of the
children were at risk. As it turned out, some of the supposed teenage
children removed were actually adults, which meant teenagers ages
fourteen to seventeen comprised less than 10% of the group, and pre-
pubescent children ages ten to thirteen comprised 13.4% of the total.597
It is unknown whether there was any additional evidence that the
state could have presented to meet its burden under the Texas Family
Code as to all of the children — with only one bite at the apple, Texas
was unable to show abuse under its removal standard in effect at
the time.
3. Between the Cracks
Justice Harriet O’Neill agreed with the Third Court of Appeals
and the Texas Supreme Court that there was no imminent risk to the
pre-pubescent girls and teenage boys on the YFZ Ranch.598 Child re-
movals under the Texas Family Code are allowed when there is an
immediate danger to the child’s physical health or safety or when
the child has been a victim of neglect or sexual abuse.599 Under the
definition of neglect, a child could be removed from the YFZ Ranch if
the child had been left “in a situation where [she] would be exposed
to a substantial risk of physical or mental harm” and the parents
did not make arrangements for the “necessary care” of the child, or
593. Id.
594. Id.
595. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.).
596. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., May 2, 2008 Counts, Placement of
Children from Eldorado, available at http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/About/News/2008/2008
-05-02_eldorado_counts.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
597. Id.
598. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. 2008)
(per curiam) (O’Neill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
599. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 262.102, .104, .107 (Vernon 2008).
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demonstrated “an intent not to return.” 600 While this arguably could
include a circumstance where parents agreed to the spiritual marriage
of a child under the age of eighteen, the Texas Family Code specifically
provides that “placing a child in or failing to remove the child from a
situation in which the child would be exposed to a substantial risk of
sexual conduct harmful to the child” is a neglectful act or omission.601
Texas stated that there were forty-three females between twelve
and seventeen years old who were removed from the YFZ Ranch.602
The evidence presented at the fourteen-day hearing showed that five
young women who had given birth between thirteen and sixteen
years old were now legally adults and not eligible for protection by
DFPS.603 It is uncertain whether these young women gave their cor-
rect date of birth, but the only real pattern that could be shown was
that of teenage pregnancy.604 Out of the twenty different DFPS in-
vestigation documents for these young women, only six admitted to
being married.605 Most of the women refused to give any information
about fathers of their children.606 This left a bit of a hole in the state’s
argument which it attempted to fill by the testimony of Dr. Perry and
even Dr. Walsh.607 The fact of the matter remained that there were
five minor females on the YFZ Ranch that had become pregnant be-
tween thirteen and seventeen years of age,608 as well as other female
600. Id. § 261.001(4)(A).
601. Id. § 261.001(4)(B)(iv).
602. ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 3.
603. See CPS Investigator’s Chart, supra note 20 (listing the birth dates of the girls
and their ages at the time they gave birth). Alice Jessop, Louisa Jessop Steed, Pamela
Jessop Jeffs, Merilyn Keate Barlow, and Sarah Cathleen Jessop Nielsen had given birth
between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, and were eighteen years old or older at the time
of the YFZ raid. Id.
604. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 2-3 (describing the pattern
of teenage marriage and pregnancy as well as the way the girls switched names and
other tactics they used to mislead investigators).
605. CPS Investigation Summary: Rebecca Dutson, Petitioner’s Exhibit 7, 6 Reporter’s
Record, supra note 15; CPS Investigation Summary: Ruleen J. Emak, Petitioner’s Exhibit
10, 6 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15; CPS Investigation Summary: Janet J. Jessop,
Petitioner’s Exhibit 13, 6 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15; CPS Investigation Summary:
Alice Jessop, Petitioner’s Exhibit 14, 6 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15; CPS Investigation
Summary: Sarah E. Johnson, Petitioner’s Exhibit 17, 7 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15;
CPS Investigation Summary: Marie Steed, Petitioner’s Exhibit 21, 7 Reporter’s Record,
supra note 15. Sarah E. Johnson did not speak explicitly about being married, but her
married status was inferred because she had a five-month-old daughter. CPS Investigation
Summary: Sarah E. Johnson, Petitioner’s Exhibit 17, supra.
606. See sources cited supra note 605 (listing only five women who gave specific
information about their husbands).
607. See 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 73, 77, 169-71 (discussing the allegedly
abusive practices of the FLDS Church).
608. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00325-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.).
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teens of marriageable age that were at risk for sexual abuse.609 These
children fell between the cracks during the en masse hearing and
the subsequent appellate court review. Had the state filed the cases
individually rather than argue that all of the children were part of
one household, these children may have been afforded the protection
of the state and remained in foster care.
IV. THE DIFFERENCE MAKERS
A. Procedural Moves
DFPS has fourteen days from the time that they remove a child
from his or her parents to the time of the full adversary hearing be-
fore a district court judge regarding whether the child should remain
in the custody of the state.610 In this short time frame, the DFPS in-
vestigator is charged with completing a large number of tasks, includ-
ing interviewing the children, parents, relatives, caregivers, school or
daycare personnel (if any), conducting background checks on pro-
spective relative placements, conducting a home study on a prospec-
tive relative placement, gathering documentation of the abuse from
doctors or other service providers, and videotaping or audiotaping
the interviews with children unless good cause can be shown for not
taping.611 Due to the overwhelming number of parents and children
in the YFZ case, DFPS could have requested a motion for continu-
ance from the court in order to delay the occurrence of the fourteen-
day temporary order hearing. DFPS may then have been able to sort
out the various families, match children with mothers and fathers
(if possible) so that they could correctly identify each set of parents,
gather more evidence, or spend more time thoroughly interviewing
the children and parents involved.
Section 262.103 of the Texas Family Code provides that “[a] tem-
porary restraining order or attachment of the child issued under
[Chapter 262] expires not later than [fourteen] days after the date it
is issued unless [the order] is extended as provided by the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure.” 612 The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allow for
postponement or continuance,613 which DFPS could have requested
because of the fact that many of the DFPS case workers encountered
609. See id. (noting that DFPS had not proved that the boys and pre-pubescent girls
were in danger, but failing to address the status of the pubescent girls).
610. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
611. Id. §§ 261.301(a)-.302, 262.114 (Vernon 2008 & Supp. 2009).
612. Id. § 262.103 (Vernon 2008).
613. TEX. R. CIV. PROC. 330 (Vernon 1977) (allowing the court to grant a continuance
for cause).
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uncooperative parents and children during the investigation. Although
DFPS had obtained an order from the court which directed the leaders
of the YFZ Ranch to allow DFPS on their property to interview the
children,614 DFPS could not easily match the children with their
parents for various reasons, including the fact that some mothers
did not claim their children and stated that they belonged to a sister-
wife instead.615 Some children gave DFPS different names on various
occasions.616 There were also parents who were not located on the
YFZ Ranch and therefore may not have received notice of the law-
suit and fourteen-day hearing regarding their children.617 Though
the Texas Family Code does require that the hearing be held fourteen
days after the removal of the children,618 Texas courts have provided
for some exceptions to this rule.619 In light of the massive number of
people involved, securing accurate names of the children, notice and
service of process on all parents, and additional evidence should have
qualified as good cause for a continuance of the first due process hear-
ing. A continuance could have made a difference in the way the case
was presented by DFPS as well as increased the amount of evidence
presented.
B. Judicial Administrative Action
The Texas Family Code provides that there be a presiding judge
over each administrative judicial region, and that this presiding judge,
“after conferring with the judges of courts in the region having family
law jurisdiction and a child protection caseload, shall determine which
courts require the appointment of a full-time or part-time associate
judge to complete each case within the times specified in Chapters
262 and 263.” 620 Section 201.201 of the Texas Family Code sets forth
614. Order for Investigation, supra note 79.
615. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 2 (“One alleged mother
identified four children as being hers and later indicated that they were not.”); see supra
text accompanying notes 592-594 (describing sister-wives who claimed their younger
sister-wife’s child in order to protect her).
616. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 5, at 2.
617. See Bishop’s Record, supra note 90 (listing mothers who lived outside the YFZ
Ranch although their husbands and children remained on the ranch); see also TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 262.201(f) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (“When citation by publication is needed . . .
because the location of the parent . . . is unknown, the court may render a temporary order
without delay . . . without regard to whether notice of the citation by publication has
been published.”).
618. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
619. See, e.g., In re J.M.C., 109 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tex. App. 2003) (“If a full adversary
hearing is not held within fourteen days, the remedy for both the parents and [DFPS]
is to compel the trial court by mandamus to conduct the adversary hearing promptly.”).
620. § 201.201(a) (footnotes omitted).
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parameters whereby the judges in the region of Eldorado, Texas, and
other judges from neighboring regions could have come together to
appoint part-time associate judges to assist the local district court
judge in hearing the statutorily required fourteen-day hearing.621 In
fact, presiding judges of administrative judicial regions could limit
the appointment of a full-time or part-time associate judge “to a spec-
ified period and . . . terminate [the] appointment at any time.” 622
Whereas the State Bar of Texas came together in an enormous fashion
to recruit over 350 family law attorneys to represent the children of
the YFZ Ranch, there was not as much rallying to assist the local judi-
ciary in its role as fact finder in this extremely complex case that
garnered worldwide media attention.623
Instead, Judge Barbara Walther, a seasoned District Court Judge
experienced in the area of family law, was stuck with maneuvering
the docket with three to four cases involving over 200 parents and
468 children.624 The presiding judge of the administrative judicial
region could have intervened to offset the complexity of the case and
relieve the impossible task of providing a full adversarial hearing for
each parent before one local district court judge.625 Section 201.201
of the Texas Family Code provides that an associate judge “may be
appointed to serve more than one court” 626 and can be hosted in a
county determined by majority vote of the presiding judges of the
administrative judicial region.627 Associate judges from different coun-
ties experienced in handling child protection cases could have been
appointed to serve in San Angelo to assist Judge Walther. Though the
associate judge’s decision at the fourteen-day hearings could have
been appealed by requesting a de novo hearing,628 many of the cases,
if filed individually by the state district attorney’s office, likely would
621. Id. § 201.201(c).
622. Id. § 201.201(b).
623. John Council, 400 Lawyers Volunteer as Ad Litems in FLDS Removal Cases,
TEX. LAWYER, Apr. 15, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=900005508748;
John Council, Polygamist Compound Removal Cases to Test State Civil Justice
System, TEX. LAWYER, Apr. 10, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=
900005508464.
624. ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 17, at 13; Council, Polygamist Compound
Removal, supra note 623; Arthur Raymond, Texas Judge Separates FLDS Custody Cases,
DESERET NEWS, July 26, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 13956967; Texas Courts Online,
In the Interest of the Children at YFZ Ranch, http://www.courts.state.tx.us/yfzranch/
home.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
625. It appears Presiding Judge Dean Rucker did appoint Judge John J. Specia (retired)
to help Judge Walther, but the extent of Judge Specia’s assistance is unclear. Texas Courts
Online, In the Interest of the Children at YFZ Ranch, supra note 624.
626. § 201.201(c).
627. Id. § 201.203(a) (Vernon 2008).
628. Id. § 201.015(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
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have been dismissed for lack of evidence. The state would have been
forced to meet its burden for each child individually, and the cases
where actual abuse and neglect occurred could have been appropri-
ately addressed.
After the fourteen-day hearing, the judiciary in the region took
advantage of Chapter 201 and appointed several associate judges to
assist the district with the next set of court hearings.629 At this point
however, DFPS had already had the children removed and placed in
foster care.630 In late July 2008, Judge Walther ordered DFPS to break
up the lawsuit and file the cases separately.631 By the time the cases
were being sorted out by the state, though, the Texas Supreme Court
had already come down with its decision that the children should be
returned to their families at the YFZ Ranch.632 Judicial administrative
action could have made a difference in the FLDS case which may have
resulted in the avoidance of trauma to many of the pre-pubescent
children who were placed into foster care.
C. Media Neutrality
There have been hundreds of news articles regarding the Texas
FLDS case since the removal of the children in April of 2008.633 Anec-
dotally, a survey of thirty-one attorneys who represented children in
the case found that several of them believed that the media helped
shape the outcome of the case.634 Initially when the case was first re-
ported, the media was very pro-DFPS, and expressed horror at the
teenage girls being forced into sex and plural marriages at very early
ages and having children.635 After the media coverage describing the
children being forced apart from their mothers and the interviews
629. Paul A. Anthony, Extra Judges Mustered for Monumental Child Status Hearings
in YFZ Ranch Custody Case, GO SAN ANGELO STANDARD-TIMES, May 9, 2008, http://www
.gosanangelo.com/news/2008/may/09/extra-judges-mustered-for-monumental-child-in/.
630. Derbyshire, supra note 33.
631. Raymond, supra note 624.
632. Id.
633. A Westlaw search on Feb. 24, 2010, for all news articles regarding the 2008 raid
on the YFZ Ranch in Texas returned over 500 results.
634. Survey for Attorneys ad Litem[ ] in FLDS Case (Aug.-Oct. 2008) (on file with
author). The anonymous Internet survey consisted of ten questions, including one that
asked, “[h]ow much influence do you think the media made on the case?” and was con-
ducted by the author via SurveyMonkey.com. The survey culled responses from thirty-
one attorneys.
635. E.g., Bryan Appleyard, Church of the Child Brides, SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), June
22, 2008, at 48, 51; Albert Hawkins, We Had Good Reason to Act: Texas Child Protection
Officials Saw a Pervasive Pattern of Abuse, USA TODAY, June 3, 2008, at 11A; Brooke
Adams, Texas Report: Child Abuse, Neglect Widespread in FLDS, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Dec.24, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 24648645.
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with the mothers, the country’s cultural and moral compass changed
and more critical coverage of the case ensued.636 The mothers were
the ones who were seen as victims, and quickly the language in the
press changed from children rescued from abusers to children ripped
apart from their families.637 The interesting thing about the media’s
response is that both statements arguably were true.
News articles heavily focused on the subject of the custody battle
between the state and the FLDS, and the subsequent criminal trials.
There were a substantial number of articles that were critical of DFPS
and played to the issue of fractured FLDS families.638 Some attorneys
complained that the state leaked information to the media, while
others complained that the FLDS used the media to soften the public
perception of polygamy and the women and children involved in the
case.639 It can definitely be argued by both sides that the media helped
to disseminate information that would eventually sway the public
in one direction or another. Though sympathy was drawn from the
depiction of distraught mothers and children immediately after the
raid, a much less forgiving tone has been adopted over the indictment
of a dozen men on bigamy and sexual assault charges.640 Whereas
the civil suit against the parents arguably failed to protect the chil-
dren most at risk, the criminal suits will likely succeed in prosecuting
the perpetrators of crimes against children.641 The question becomes
whether the mothers will continue to advocate for and raise the chil-
dren within the polygamous lifestyle, despite the fact that some of the
men will be convicted and sentenced to terms in prison.
With the advent of the Internet, blogs, and invited commentary
from the public by the media, it is questionable whether the media
636. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 1, at 7C (describing the state’s accusations against
the YFZ Ranch inhabitants as “damning,” and noting that the breadth of the state’s
removal was beginning to raise constitutional questions and concerns).
637. Id.; see also Ty Meighan, Editorial, Polygamists in Texas Try to Spin it Their Way,
AUGUSTA CHRON., Apr. 23, 2008, at A09 (noting that after FLDS mothers appeared on
national television, “some people . . . blasted the state’s actions” and “complained about the
‘horrifying’ assault by ‘San Angelo authorities’ ”).
638. Cheers and Jeers, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 31, 2008, at B15; Dennis
Romboy, Lawyer is Keen on Justice for FLDS Clients, DESERET NEWS, June 9, 2008, at
B01; Jan Jarboe Russell, Polygamy Case Drives Home Need to Reinvent Child Welfare
System, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 22, 2008, at 09B.
639. Survey for Attorneys, supra note 634.
640. See Gary Martin, Top-Ranking Senator Files Legislation to Aid Victims of
Polygamist Sects, HOUSTON CHRON., July 25, 2008, at A8; Winslow, supra note 442, at
A06 (discussing the indictments of FLDS men).
641. See Choate, supra note 374 (reporting on the guilty verdict in the case against
Raymond Merrill Jessop, and noting that the evidence seized during the raid was instru-
mental in the prosecution’s case); Dave Hawkins, Jeffs Awaits Arizona Trial, CORPUS
CHRISTI CALLER TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at B10 (reporting that Allen Eugene Keate was the
second member of the YFZ Ranch to be convicted and sentenced for sexual assault of a
child). Mr. Keate was sentenced on Dec. 18, 2008, to ten years in prison. Id.
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just reports the story or plays to the interest of its viewers and
readers.642 It remains to be seen whether the media will be critical
of DFPS actions in the FLDS community in the future. It is quite pos-
sible that the criminal cases may yield more evidence that might be
useful in subsequent civil child protection cases. If new evidence is
located, DFPS may be able to file individual suits against parents
who have been abusive or neglectful, but this time the media, as well
as the evidence, will be on DFPS’s side.
D. Full Inclusion of the Children
Though child protection cases are primarily about the safety
and well-being of the children who are the subject of the suit, it is
rare to see a child in court at a fourteen-day hearing or at any other
hearing for that matter.643 The extent to which children are regu-
larly included in the court’s supervision of a case is through their
GAL and their attorney.644 Appointment of a GAL and attorney is
mandatory pursuant to the Texas Family Code.645 The GAL and the
attorney for the child can be the same person — one attorney is
appointed in a dual capacity.646 The FLDS case appeared to start
out with the assumption that these two roles would conflict with one
another such that each child needed a different person as GAL and
an attorney.647 CASA were appointed as the GALs and over 350 attor-
neys from around the state of Texas were appointed as attorneys for
the children.648
GALs are charged with providing the court with recommenda-
tions relating to the best interests of the child and the bases for the
recommendations.649 The attorneys for children are to represent the
642. See Committee of Concerned Journalists, Can Journalism Be Impartial? The
Media’s Relationship to Fact, Fairness and Gossip (Dec. 4, 1997), http://www.concerned
journalists.org/node/297 (discussing the results of a journalists’ forum on topics such as
objectivity and bias in the news media).
643. Merril Sobie, The Child Client: Representing Children in Child Protective
Proceedings, 22 TOURO L. REV. 745, 776 (2006).
644. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.011(a), .012 (Vernon 2008) (making appointment
of a GAL and an AAL mandatory in order to represent the best interests of the child).
645. Id.
646. Id. §§ 107.011(b)(3), .0125.
647. See In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613. 615 (Tex.
2008) (per curiam) (“The hearing was attended by scores of attorneys for the parties,
attorneys ad litem, guardians ad litem, Texas Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA),
and many others.”); Amanda Bronstad, Raid on Sect Brings an Army of Attorneys, NAT’L
L.J., May 5, 2008, at 4 (describing the number of pro-bono attorneys ad litem working
on the FLDS case).
648. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 615; Bronstad,
supra note 647, at 4.
649. § 107.002.
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child’s expressed objectives or desires in court, and the children are
owed the same duties that attorneys are obligated to give to adults,
with the only caveat being the competence of the child to direct the
representation of the attorney.650 The Texas Family Code provides
that in the situation where the child is not competent, the attorney
can substitute his or her judgment for the child.651 This issue of com-
petence is typically correlated with age, although this characteristic
of a child is not always an accurate way to determine competence.652
In the case of the FLDS, where Dr. Perry had already testified as to
the children’s ability to make decisions and the unavailability of real
choices in their lives,653 it may have been helpful for the judge to have
heard individualized testimony about the competence and capacity
of a select few of the teenage girls, with assistance from their GALs
and attorneys ad litem.
Interviews with children who may have been abused and ne-
glected are difficult and require training, which is why many are
handled by child advocacy centers where specially trained forensic
interviewers conduct them.654 San Angelo, Texas did have a child
advocacy center for children to be interviewed, but unfortunately
the children were not transported there for interviews.655
[T]he severest trauma of child sexual abuse is not the physical
act, but rather the emotional repercussions of the abuse . . . .
The child is not protected from those aspects of the abuse merely
650. Id. §§ 107.003-.004; Haralambie, supra note 522, at 286.
651. § 107.008(b). “An attorney ad litem . . . who determines that the child cannot
meaningfully formulate [his or her] objectives of representation may present to the court
a position that the attorney determines will serve the best interests of the child.” Id. If
there is a separate GAL appointed to the child, the AAL has to consult with the GAL
regarding his or her opinion or recommendation for the child, but is not bound by it. Id.
§ 107.008(c)(1)-(2).
652. See Haralambie, supra note 522, at 333 (noting that in some states competency
is tied to age, but pointing out that it can be determined in other ways).
653. 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 81-82.
654. Marcia Sue Cohen-Liebman, Art Therapy, in RECOGNITION OF CHILD ABUSE FOR
THE MANDATED REPORTER, supra note 157, at 227, 238-29 (noting that “[t]he central com-
ponent of a child abuse investigation is an interview of the alleged victim by a specialized
and highly skilled child interview specialist or law enforcement agent,” and that the
Children’s Advocacy Center is a nationwide model used to conduct multidisciplinary
interviews that promote interagency collaboration and minimize secondary trauma
associated with the investigative process); see also Theodore P. Cross et al., Evaluating
Children’s Advocacy Centers’ Response to Child Sexual Abuse, OJJDP JUV. JUST. BULL.,
Aug. 2008, at 1-4, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/218530.pdf (noting the
significant role that children’s advocacy centers play in response to child sexual abuse
because of the multidisciplinary investigation team, coordinated forensic interviews, and
child-friendly environment).
655. See 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 160-62 (illustrating the fact that the
investigators stayed on the ranch to interview the children).
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because a third party is able to ensure that the physical act is
not repeated. A child who maintains contact with the alleged
abuser during the evaluation process may feel unprotected and
may be exposed to very subtle threats and manipulations that
impair the child’s ability and willingness to disclose the abuse to
the evaluator.656
It is quite possible that being interviewed on the YFZ Ranch was not
that conducive to determining how some of the teenage girls truly
felt about their situation.657 Giving the girls the opportunity to speak
to the judge who would decide their fate may have been just the im-
petus needed for a few to speak out on what was an unbearable cir-
cumstance, similar to what Elissa Wall described in her book.658
On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that the teenage girls
who were at risk for underage spiritual marriages would have ex-
pressed a desire to leave their homes just because they had the oppor-
tunity to speak directly to the judge. On the contrary, some children
who have been abused and removed from their homes express the
desire to return home.659 This response illustrates why the role of the
GAL is so important. In the FLDS case, one attorney experienced the
conflict of representing a seventeen-year-old female who accused her
attorney of not representing her interests.660 The child, who is the
daughter of Warren Jeffs and alleged wife of Raymond Jessop, was
determined by the attorney to be incompetent to direct her own repre-
sentation.661 Judge Walther ended up maintaining the original attor-
ney on the case rather than replacing her with another attorney who
would pursue the expressed wish of the child, which was to return
home to the ranch.662 Giving children a voice obviously does not mean
that a judge will acquiesce to their wishes, but it does allow the judge
656. Haralambie, supra note 522, at 364.
657. 5 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 70-71 (testifying that the children would
likely feel uncomfortable disclosing intimate, potentially upsetting information).
658. See WALL WITH PULITZ, supra note 524, at 347-51 (recounting Wall’s interactions
with attorneys and investigators, which led her to press charges against Warren Jeffs).
659. Douglas J. Besharov, Introduction to HOLLIDA WAKEFIELD & RALPH UNDERWAGER,
ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 3, 13 (1988); see also Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Sexually Predatory Parents and the Children in Their Care: Remove the Threat, Not the
Child, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 39, at 51-52 (Nancy E. Dowd
et al. eds., 2006) (noting the psychological damage experienced by sexually abused children
removed from their home due to separation from their non-abusive mother, foster care
drift, and the significant risk of sexual victimization in foster care).
660. Ben Winslow, FLDS Teen Seeking a New Lawyer, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 3, 2008,
at A09.
661. Id.
662. Brooke Adams, New Move to Unseat Attorney Representing Polygamous Sect
Leader’s Daughter, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 5, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 2289916.
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to consider their viewpoint and at times observe how they developed
their opinion on a particular matter.
In the YFZ case, even if the children were unwilling to testify or
be interviewed in chambers with the judge, the AALs were cut short
during the due process hearing itself.663 Many of the attorneys for the
children lodged objections at the beginning and end of the fourteen-
day hearing regarding denial of due process and equal protection for
the children under the Constitution.664 They also objected to the for-
mat of the hearing under the Texas Family Code, arguing that the
code entitled each individual child to a full adversarial hearing.665
Full inclusion of the AALs could have made a difference in the out-
come of the case if their motions, questions, and arguments had been
individually heard.
CONCLUSION
A. Legislative Changes
According to the Texas Constitution, the Texas Legislature must
meet every two years.666 The potential, therefore, exists that the Texas
Family Code may undergo significant changes on a biennial basis.
During the 2009 legislative session, there were at least two bills that
attempted to address some of the problems that existed during the
FLDS case. Senate Bill 1440 proposed a civil warrant option which
would allow DFPS to proceed with an investigation of abuse under
section 261.667 This bill basically set forth a structured method for
DFPS to obtain information during an investigation and an avenue
to obtain access to a child when parents do not consent to making the
child available for an interview.668 The current law provides that a
family law court can grant orders in aid of investigation for good cause
without a hearing if a person interferes with an investigation of a re-
port of child abuse or neglect.669 The new law would have allowed the
state to seek a court order in aid of an investigation without having to
give notice to the parents or file a suit to obtain conservatorship.670
663. See, e.g., 4 Reporter’s Record, supra note 15, at 12-15 (objecting to the format of the
hearing but having the objection, and future objections along the same lines, overruled).
664. Id. at 12-16.
665. Id. at 12-13.
666. TEX. CONST. Art. III, § 5 (amended 1999).
667. S.B. 1440, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009).
668. Id. §§ 3(g), 4(b).
669. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.303(a)-(b) (Vernon 2008). There is no definition in the
statute of what constitutes “good cause,” or an indication of how to demonstrate good
cause. Id.
670. S.B. 1440 § 3(g).
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One of the provisions of the bill allowed the state to obtain an order
from the court for medical, psychological, or psychiatric records of a
child in a situation when the parents do not consent.671 In addition
to obtaining health records, this section includes the department’s
request for a child to submit to medical, psychological, or psychiatric
examination under court order.672
Senate Bill 1440 created a legal standard for proving to the court
that aid was necessary in an investigation, and deleted the good cause
clause in the current statute. In order to obtain an order in aid of an
investigation or for health records of a child, DFPS would have to
execute an affidavit with
facts sufficient to lead a person of ordinary prudence and caution
to believe that:
(1) based on the information available, a child’s physical or mental
health or welfare has been or may be adversely affected by abuse
or neglect;
(2) the requested order is necessary to aid in the investigation; and
(3) there is a fair probability that allegations of abuse or neglect
will be sustained if the order is issued and executed.673
The language that is significant is the inclusion of mental health in
the investigation of abuse or neglect, especially in light of the fact
that the removal standard only refers to the physical health and
safety of children. This addition shows recognition of the importance
of considering psychological maltreatment at the very beginning of
the case, and may eventually signal a change in the removal standard
in Texas to include mental health.
Senate Bill 1440 also provided that the application and affidavits
utilized to acquire court orders in aid of an investigation could be filed
any day, including Sunday.674 “A court may designate an associate
judge to render this order,” and the order would be immediately ef-
fective without ratification of the designating judge.675 A court could
render the order ex parte or require notice and a hearing before issu-
ance of an order in aid of an investigation.676 In order to require notice
and a hearing, the court would have to determine that: “(1) there is
no immediate risk to the safety of the child; and (2) notice and a
hearing are required to determine whether the requested access to
persons, records, or places or transport of the child is necessary to aid
671. Id. §§ 4(c), (c-1).
672. Id. § 4(c).
673. Id. § 4(c-2)(1)-(3).
674. Id. § 4(c-3).
675. Id. § 4(f).
676. Id. § 4(l).
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in the investigation.” 677 Finally, if the court denied the request for
an ex parte order under this section, it would not act as a bar to the
issuance of a criminal warrant.678
This bill passed through the legislature but was vetoed by
Governor Rick Perry because of protests from parents regarding the
state’s ability to access their children with no notice and no hearing
upon suspicion of abuse or neglect.679 It was dubbed the “Take Away
Your Child Act” and was stated to be an overreaction to the raid
that took place at the YFZ Ranch.680 Many parents argued that their
Fourth Amendment rights were stripped away by this bill, and that
this bill completely undermined parental rights.681 Governor Perry
did not reference the FLDS case in his official statement as to why
he vetoed the bill,682 but he did reference Gates v. Texas Department
of Protective and Regulatory Services.683 He commented that the Gates
case created some uncertainty regarding how state caseworkers could
transport children from their homes to obtain interviews in order to
complete investigations.684 He further stated that Senate Bill 1440
was the state’s attempt to clarify this process for caseworkers, but that
it “overreache[d] and may not give due consideration to the Fourth
Amendment rights of a parent or guardian.” 685
Another proposed bill contained language that addressed sev-
eral problems that surfaced during the FLDS case. House Bill 4255
provides that the court may find that even though DFPS made no
efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove a child, “the court
may find that based on the circumstances, no reasonable efforts would
prevent or eliminate the need to remove a child.” 686 Since the appel-
late court found that the state did not show reasonable efforts,687 it
677. Id. § 4(l)(1)-(2).
678. Id. § 4(m).
679. Senate Journal, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5164-65 (Tex.  2009) (Proclamation by the
Governor of the State of Texas) [hereinafter Veto Proclamation].
680. Sarah Foster, NewsWithViews.com, Coalition Asks Texas Governor to Veto “Take
Away Your Child Act” (June 18, 2009), http://www.newswithviews.com/NWV-News/
news149.htm.
681. Id.
682. Veto Proclamation, supra note 679, at 5164-65.
683. Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 423 (5th Cir.
2008) (holding that exigent circumstances did not exist to justify initial warrantless entry
into home by social workers from DFPS). The court ultimately concluded that exigent
circumstances justified the removal of the children from the home on the date of entry,
but emphasized that the facts of the latter exigent circumstances analysis were not
revealed until after the children were interviewed in the home. Id. at 430 n.17.
684. Veto Proclamation, supra note 679, at 5164.
685. Id.
686. H.B. 4255, § 6(b)-(c), 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009).
687. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.).
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would be helpful for the state if it could show that under certain cir-
cumstances, this reasonable effort would not have to be made. House
Bill 4255 also seeks to modify the Texas Family Code such that a court
may only issue an order to remove the alleged perpetrator from the
home, rather than the child, if all available facts indicate that the
remaining parent or guardian is going to abide by the terms of the
temporary restraining order.688 Since the Texas Supreme Court deter-
mined that the district court had broad authority to protect children
short of separating them from their parents, including the option to
remove the alleged perpetrator,689 the author of the bill wanted to
ensure the safety of children if both parents were aware of the abuse
and took no reasonable steps to prevent it.690 House Bill 4255 did not
reach the legislature for a vote at the end of the 2009 legislative ses-
sion,691 but is going through various stages for submission in the 2011
legislative session. The Texas Legislature did not consider amending
some of its definitions, such as the term “safety” within the context
of chapter 261 and 262 (so as to include a mentally secure home envi-
ronment), or include the term “mental and emotional danger” within
chapter 262 of the Texas Family Code.692
B. Switching Gears
After all of the children were returned, the Texas Attorney
General’s Office indicted several men on the YFZ Ranch, as well as
Warren Jeffs, who was jailed in Arizona at the time.693 When dealing
with child sexual abuse, criminal law can sometimes provide more pro-
tection for children because of their age.694 “A child’s age, dependent
688. H.B. 4255 § 7(b)(4).
689. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. 2008)
(per curiam).
690. Press Release, Harvey Hilderbran, Texas House of Representatives, Rep.
Hilderbran Bill Seeks Strong Protection for Victims of Child Abuse (Mar. 18, 2009),
available at http://www.house.state.tx.us/news/release.php?id=2610.
691. See, e.g., Texas Legislature Online, Legislative Session 81(R) History, http://www
.legis.state.tx.us/billlookup/History.aspx?LegSess=81R&Bill=HB4255&Sort=A (last visited
Mar. 4, 2010) (noting that the bill was placed on the general state calendar in May 2009).
692. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 261.001, 262.201 (Vernon 2008 & Supp. 2009)
with H.B. 4255, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009) (failing to make any changes regarding
the child’s safety or any addition of the terms mental or emotional danger).
693. News Release, Greg Abbott, supra note 51; see also ELDORADO INVESTIGATION,
supra note 17, at 4 (stating that all of the children were returned by June 4, 2008).
694. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (noting that the Court has
“sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth
even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected
rights,” and holding that “[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
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status, and inability to consent make nonviolent child sexual abuse
both criminal and wrong, even when the child does not appear to be
physically or emotionally damaged by the encounter.” 695 “[I]nsti-
tutionalized patriarchy,” however, caused centuries of silence and
shame about child sexual abuse.696 The early marriages within the
FLDS are promoted within the religion as a badge of honor and serve
to legitimate, at least within their culture, the sexual activity be-
tween adult men and minor females.697 Professor and scholar Martin
Guggenheim notes in his recent article that the child welfare system
is ill-equipped to deal with polygamy cases, and the criminal justice
system is where this type of case is most appropriately handled.698
For a criminal prosecution to occur, a child victim would have
to testify against her spiritual husband. The Supreme Court in
Crawford v. Washington established that a person accused of a crime
has the right under the Fourth Amendment to confront and cross-
examine his accuser, regardless of the age of the victim.699 The only
way that a child would be absolved of testifying in a criminal court
proceeding is if the child was unavailable and the defendant had the
prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.700 Although Crawford
does not apply in civil court, it does impact the prosecution of criminal
child abuse cases because child hearsay statements are no longer
generally admissible when the child is not available to testify.701 It
622, 634 (1979) (noting that the Court has acknowledged “three reasons justifying the
conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of
adults,” including “the peculiar vulnerability of children [and] their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner”); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890) (“[P]arens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State . . . . for the prevention of injury to those
who cannot protect themselves.”).
695. Erna Olafson, Child Sexual Abuse, in SEXUALIZED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
CHILDREN 151, 152 (B.J. Cling ed., 2004) (citation omitted).
696. Id.
697. See In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (mem.) (highlighting DFPS’s belief that the ranch inhabitants have a “pervasive
belief system” encouraging marital relationships between older men and minor girls).
698. Martin Guggenheim, Texas Polygamy and Child Welfare, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 759,
762, 812 (2009).
699. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 68 (2004) (stating that under the
Sixth Amendment, testimonial statements may only be submitted in lieu of the witness’s
presence in the courtroom when the witness is unavailable and the accused has had an
opportunity to cross examine the witness prior to trial).
700. Id. at 68.
701. See, e.g., Laurie E. Martin, Note, Child Abuse Witness Protections Confront
Crawford v. Washington, 39 IND. L. REV. 113, 113 (2005) (noting that the Court’s decision
in Crawford invites “questions about the validity of many protective statutes and child
hearsay exceptions under the Confrontation Clause” by “establish[ing] that testimonial,
out-of-court statements by witnesses not appearing at trial are inadmissible unless the
witness is unavailable, . . . and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
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is unlikely that the state of Texas will attempt to use any spiritual
wives who are unwilling to testify in the criminal cases. Furthermore,
if the DNA testing is sufficient to show parentage by adult men of
children borne to minors, there may be no need for testimony of the
alleged victims.702
The impact of constitutional law on criminal cases involving
religion is that it is fairly clear that the FLDS men will not be able
to use the First Amendment as a defense in any of their pending crim-
inal suits. In State v. Hardesty, the Court of Appeals of Arizona held
that Arizona laws prohibiting the possession of marijuana are neutral
laws of general applicability, and thus “the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment does not afford [a d]efendant an exemption
from these laws, even if they have the incidental effect of burdening
his religious practices.” 703 Though the indicted FLDS men might
argue that the state bigamy statutes are targeted against funda-
mentalist polygamous groups, similar to the statute against animal
sacrifices in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,704 strict scrutiny review of bigamy laws will not be appro-
priate. State laws against bigamy are neutral laws of general appli-
cability; thus no heightened constitutional protection will be afforded
for any man charged with bigamy or sexual assault of a minor.705
C. The Big Picture
While it is hard to fathom over 400 children being removed from
their parents at the same time, the reality is that these children rep-
resented a less than three percent increase in the number of youths
in Texas foster care.706 At the time of this child removal, there were
approximately 17,500 children in foster care.707 The latter number
the witness”). But see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 104.002-.006 (Vernon 2008) (listing various
hearsay exceptions to the rule that child witnesses in child abuses cases must be present
to testify).
702. See Choate, supra note 368 (discussing the importance of DNA testing in the
Raymond Merril Jessop criminal case).
703. State v. Hardesty, 204 P.3d 407, 413 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
704. 508 U.S. 520, 531, 545-46 (1993) (holding that a law targeting certain religious
conduct was subject to strict scrutiny because it embodied an attempt to prohibit a specific
practice of a particular religion and therefore was not a law of general applicability).
705. See, e.g., State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 742 (Utah 2006) (finding that Utah’s bigamy
law is a law of general applicability).
706. Letter from Carey D. Cockerell, Commissioner, Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective
Servs., to The Honorable Jane Nelson, Chairman of the Health & Human Servs. Comm.
(Apr. 30, 2008), available at http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/documents/about/pdf/2008-04
-30_Nelson.pdf.
707. Id.
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should be the more alarming of the two, but the public is typically
not made aware of how many children are caught up in the child
welfare system.708 Another alarming fact of which most of the nation
is unaware is that the majority of children in foster care are African-
Americans.709 One of the key difference-makers in the YFZ case was
the media.710 It was not lost on many within the child welfare system
that more attention and deference were given to these white families
and mothers than to the collective thousands of African-American
children disproportionately affected in child protection cases.711
The State of Texas raid of the YFZ Ranch played out in similar
fashion as the Short Creek Raid of 1953 with many of the same mis-
takes made by state authorities and arguably similar ultimate results.
Though Texas did not enter the YFZ Ranch with the express intent
of arresting all the adults for the crime of polygamy as Arizona did
in 1953, both states did focus on child sexual abuse. The dominant
theme of both legal cases centered around the religious beliefs of the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and
the appeals revolved around whether the state’s proof of actual harm
to the children was sufficient, as well as the underlying legal issue:
whether the state’s action infringed on the group’s First Amendment
rights.
It is unlikely that another raid will occur in Texas or any other
state any time soon. If history serves as an indicator, the FLDS will
learn from its mistakes and retreat even further to isolated areas in
the United States, perhaps in states where law enforcement does not
care to enforce bigamy statutes.712 The health and safety of the FLDS
children are still of concern to many who saw the broad brush of
708. See ABC News/Time Poll: Foster Care, Broad Support for Reform in U.S. Foster
Care System, ABC NEWS, May 30, 2006, at 5, available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/
Politics/1011a1FosterCare.pdf (noting that in answer to the question of how much
attention the respondents have paid to the foster care system, 31% said “only some,” 39%
said “hardly any,” and 4% said “none”).
709. See Report of the Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Gender Working Group, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 411, 411-12, 419 (2001) (discussing the fact that although 55% of children placed
in foster care in a short period were black, and 70.4% of all children in foster care were
black, there is a lack of public acknowledgment of the issue, and recommending that the
public should be educated about the racial imbalance).
710. See supra text accompanying notes 633-642 (discussing the media’s role in the
outcome of the case).
711. See Jessica Dixon, The African-American Child Welfare Act: A Legal Redress for
African-American Disproportionality in Child Protection Cases, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM.
L. & POL’Y 109, 110-12 (2008) (documenting the overrepresentation of African-American
children in foster care in the United States and proposing a new federal law to address
the issue of disparate impact).
712. See Driggs, supra note 268, at 57-60 (recounting the increasing pressure from the
Mormon Church as well as state authorities, which was behind the polygamists’ move
to Short Creek).
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the court seemingly sweep some abuses under the rug. Perhaps the
final lesson will be learned by state agencies that consider the various
types of harms inflicted upon children each day and make decisions
about whether to separate families or work to keep them together.
State court systems are left with unresolved questions regarding
how to weigh physical and mental harm and danger to a child against
a parent’s religious rights and the state’s power to intervene in
private family matters in order to protect a child. The “Texas Mis-
Step” does not have to be a failure if the child welfare system im-
proves as a result. The question remains: will the judiciary, lawyers,
and state agencies address the necessary critical issues to ensure the
safety of children who are now and will in the future reside in FLDS
communities?
